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This Article examines the risk exposure of business 
organizations involved in disputes over rights in social media 
accounts. The complexity of both the legal rights asserted and 
the judicial rationales used to adjudicate these rights triggers 
unique risks for business organizations. Increasingly, 
business organizations rely on social media outreach to 
perform core business operations such as advertising, 
marketing, marketing intelligence, and sales. These uses 
engender litigation and create judicial precedent in which 
courts struggle to define and delineate the legal rights and 
remedies applicable to these disputes. There are unresolved 
legal issues resulting from conflicting analytical frameworks 
advocated by litigants and used by courts to adjudicate these 
disputes. Operating in this complicated legal environment 
poses unique risks for business organizations. This Article 
analyzes those risks and proposes risk mitigation strategies. 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................... 428 
II. The Legal Landscape of Social Media Account  
Business Disputes: A Long and Winding Road ......... 432 
A. The Employee’s Rights in a Social Media  
Account Used for Business .................................. 433 
1. PhoneDog v. Kravitz ....................................... 433 
2. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group . 436 
3. Eagle v. Morgan ............................................. 442 
4. Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television . 448 
 
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Ethics, Williams College of 
Business, Xavier University; 2015–2017 Faculty Fellow, Cintas Institute 
for Business Ethics, Xavier University. 
2018.2_HIDY_FINAL 
No. 2:426] BUSINESS DISPUTES OVER SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 427 
5. Vaughn v. Radio One ..................................... 451 
6. CDM Media USA v. Simms............................ 452 
7. Ardis Health v. Nankivell .............................. 455 
8. Christou v. Beatport ....................................... 457 
9. Emerald City v. Kahn ..................................... 459 
10. WBS v. Croucier ............................................. 461 
B. The Independent Contractor and Business  
Social Media Accounts ......................................... 462 
C. Business Management Companies and Social 
Media Accounts ................................................... 464 
D. Bankruptcy Proceedings and Business Social 
Media Accounts ................................................... 466 
III. The Judicial Precedent: A Complicated Legal  
Terrain ....................................................................... 471 
A. Property Rights and Social Media Accounts ....... 472 
B. The Right to Control a Social Media Account ..... 474 
C. Social Media Accounts and Interference with 
Economic Opportunities and Contractual 
Relationships ....................................................... 477 
D. Intellectual Property Violations and Social  
Media Accounts ................................................... 478 
E. Fiduciary Duties and Social Media Accounts ..... 481 
F. Privacy Rights and Social Media Accounts......... 482 
G. Social Media Account Valuations and Damages 
Calculations ......................................................... 483 
IV. The Resultant Business Risks and Proposals for  
Risk Mitigation .......................................................... 486 
A. The Creation of Social Media Accounts .............. 487 
B. The Management of Social Media Accounts  
and Company Policies ......................................... 488 
C. Contract Review and Due Diligence Involving 
Social Media Accounts ......................................... 490 
D. Remedies and Risk Management of Social  
Media Account Disputes ...................................... 492 
V. Conclusion .................................................................. 494 
 
2018.2_HIDY_FINAL  
428 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As individual social media engagement grows each year, 
business organizations increasingly rely on social media to 
perform core business functions, such as advertising, 
marketing, and sales.1 This trend presents emerging 
business risks triggered by disputes over control of business 
social media accounts and a complex and confusing legal 
framework used to adjudicate these disputes. As business 
organizations expand their social media presence, their risk 
exposure arising from these legal issues expands.2  
The number of individuals using social media represents 
a substantial percentage of all internet users and a 
significant portion of the adult population in the United 
States. A 2016 Pew Research Center study reports the 
significant social media engagement of individuals in the 
United States on at least one, and often multiple, social 
media sites:  
• 79% of internet users use Facebook, which 
represents 68% of all U.S. adults,3  
• 32% of internet users use Instagram, which 
represents 28% of all U.S. adults,4  
 
1 See, e.g., Shea Bennett, 88% of Brands Will Use Social Media 
Marketing in 2014 [Study], ADWEEK (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.adweek.com/digital/smm-2014/ [perma.cc/9HC8-QWBP]; 
Facebook, Twitter Remain Top Social Networks Used by US Companies, 
EMARKETER (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Facebook-
Twitter-Remain-Top-Social-Networks-Used-by-US-Companies/1013290 
[perma.cc/834W-FSQV]. 
2 For a discussion of the role of legal compliance in the strategic 
management of a firm’s resources, see generally Constance E. Bagley, 
What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 587 (2010). 
3 Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016: Facebook 
Usage and Engagement Is on the Rise, While Adoption of Other Platforms 
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• 24% of internet users use Twitter, which 
represents 21% of all U.S. adults,5  
• 29% of internet users use LinkedIn, which 
represents 25% of all U.S. adults,6 and  
• 31% of internet users are on Pinterest, which 
represents 26% of all U.S. adults.7  
The study further found that fifty-six percent of adults who 
use the internet use more than one of these five social media 
sites.8 While the demographics of social media users vary by 
age, gender, education level, and income,9 Facebook’s global 
footprint dominates the market in most countries around the 
world.10 Facebook in 2017 boasted two billion monthly users 
globally, a seventeen percent increase from the previous 
year.11  
Business organizations market to this growing population 
of social media users through social media outreach with a 
reported eighty-eight percent of brands in the United States 
with one hundred or more employees engaging in social 
media marketing.12 Business engagement on social media 
sites is driven by the multivalent impact such outreach has 
on a business organization’s core operations, as its 
marketing strategies, advertising, sales, and marketing 
intelligence capabilities are directly affected by social media 







10 Facebook Remains the Largest Social Network in Most Major 
Markets, EMARKETER (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Facebook-Remains-Largest-Social-
Network-Most-Major-Markets/1013798 [perma.cc/6HFZ-AM9A].  
11 Mark Zuckerberg Says Facebook Now Has 2 Billion Users 
Worldwide, FORTUNE (June 27, 2017, 1:56 PM), 
http://www.fortune.com/2017/06/27/mark%20-%20zuckerberg%20-
%20facebook%20-userbase/ [perma.cc/B58E-L28J]. 
12 Bennett, supra note 1. 
13 Joan Lindsey-Mullikin & Norm Borin, Why Strategy Is Key for 
Successful Social Media Sales, 60 BUS. HORIZONS 473, 473–74 (2017). 
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that “networked enterprises,” which include those that 
engage in social media outreach, are “more likely to be 
market leaders and also more likely to have higher margins 
than companies using the Web in more traditional ways.”14 
These efforts have measurable outcomes. For example, the 
value of advertising on social media worldwide was 
estimated to be $17.74 billion in 2014, a jump from $11.36 
billion the previous year.15 Social media impacts an 
estimated fifty-four percent of consumers’ decisions as 
brands leverage these platforms to increase sales by 
“reminding, informing, and entertaining customers.”16  
Businesses’ expenditures to create, maintain, and litigate 
over social media accounts corroborate the contention that 
such accounts are valuable business assets: 
One indication of this value is the large sum which 
companies have spent developing and maintaining a 
viable presence on Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, 
Google+ and other platforms, and creating marketing 
campaigns that utilized these mediums. Indeed, a 
multi-billion dollar industry has been created to help 
firms manage their social media footprint . . . .17 
The social media platforms that are the “most popular” 
for selling merchandise are Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, 
and Pinterest.18 Data further suggests that the type of social 
media platform employed by a business to interact with its 
customers influences the level of attention the brand 
receives. For example, the market leader in social media 
platforms is Facebook, but Instagram users interact with 
brands 58 times more often than Facebook users and 120 
 
14 John G. Loughnane et al., Valuation of Social Media Assets, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2015, at 36, 36 (quoting David Gilfoil & Charles Jobs, 
Return on Investment for Social Media: A Proposed Framework for 
Understanding, Implementing and Measuring the Return, 10 J. BUS. & 
ECON. RES. 637, 638 (2012)). 
15 Lindsey-Mullikin & Borin, supra note 13, at 474. 
16 Id. at 481. 
17 Loughnane, supra note 13, at 36. 
18 Lindsey-Mullikin & Borin, supra note 13, at 474. 
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times more often than Twitter users.19 The potential to 
convert a social media post into an actual sale is both 
measurable and, in part, related to which social media site 
the business employs: “[A]n Instagram photo next to an item 
for sale boosts sales conversions by a factor of seven.”20 
Social media is an accessible, affordable, and useful tool for 
business organizations to capture market share and build 
brand loyalty. But legal risks attend the business use of 
social media.  
Business use of social media accounts to connect with and 
influence customers and clients has led to legal disputes over 
the right to control and derive economic benefits from the 
accounts.21 These disputes arise when a business 
organization’s right to control a social media account is 
challenged by an employee,22 an independent contractor,23 a 
corporate debtor in bankruptcy,24 or a social media 
management company that refuses to relinquish control over 
the account it manages on behalf of the business 
organization.25 Litigation ensues and the courts wrestle with 
a myriad of legal questions posed by a technological 
advancement—namely, a social media account—that has 
legal kinship with property rights,26 privacy rights,27 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (“Fifty-three percent of adults between the ages of 18 and 29 use 
Instagram . . . making it arguably the world’s most powerful platform for 
brands . . . .”). 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See, e.g., Maremont v. Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26557 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
23 See, e.g., Salonclick, L.L.C. v. Superego Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 16 Civ. 
2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017). 
24 See, e.g., In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 
2015). 
25 See, e.g., Keypath Educ., Inc. v. Brightstar Educ., Inc., No. 16-cv-
2545-JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017). 
26 See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *26–27 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011); see infra Section 
III.A for a discussion of the judicial precedent on this issue. 
27 See In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 377–78; see infra Section III.F for a 
discussion of the judicial precedent on this issue. 
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intellectual property rights,28 contract rights,29 and duties 
arising under tort law.30 The precedent that emerges is 
complex, confusing, and, in certain instances, contradictory. 
This Article examines the risk exposure of business 
organizations operating in this legal environment when 
disputes over rights in social media accounts arise. Part II of 
this Article reviews the judicial precedent and identifies the 
legal theories examined by courts to define and delineate the 
rights arising in social media account business disputes. Part 
III explores the complicated and, in certain instances, 
unresolved legal issues resulting from the analytical 
frameworks discussed in Part II. Finally, Part IV 
investigates the risks posed to business organizations 
operating in this legal environment and proposes a 
framework for mitigating risk caused by social media 
account disputes. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACCOUNT BUSINESS DISPUTES: A LONG AND 
WINDING ROAD 
Business disputes over the right to control and derive 
economic benefits from social media accounts are 
increasingly adjudicated by the courts. These challenges 
arise under both federal and state law.31 The legal claims 
cover a wide array of asserted rights rooted in the law of 
 
28 See, e.g., Christou v. Beatport, 849 F. Supp.2d 1055, 1074–77 (D. 
Colo. 2012); see infra Section III.D for a discussion of the judicial precedent 
on this issue. 
29 See, e.g., CDM Media v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37458, at *5–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015); see infra Section III.C for 
a discussion of the judicial precedent on this issue. 
30 See, e.g., Ardis Health v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011); see generally infra 
Part III for a discussion of the judicial precedent on this issue. 
31 See, e.g., Maremont v. Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26557 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014); Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *14–15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
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contracts, torts, and intellectual property.32 The disputes 
themselves arise from contested control over social media 
accounts between business organizations and various 
parties, including former employees, independent 
contractors, former business partners, and business entities 
retained to manage these accounts.33 The context of these 
disputes include employment terminations, soured business 
partnerships, and bankruptcy proceedings. What emerges 
from the precedent is a kaleidoscope of judicial rationales 
used by courts to define and delineate the legal rights over 
these social media accounts. 
A. The Employee’s Rights in a Social Media Account 
Used for Business 
1. PhoneDog v. Kravitz 
In PhoneDog v. Kravitz,34 the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California considered a 
legal challenge brought by a business against a former 
employee who refused to give up control of a Twitter account. 
The business, PhoneDog, provided news and web resources 
for mobile products and services.35 PhoneDog’s promotional 
and marketing social media outreach to its customer base 
included the use of multiple social media sites such as 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.36 Employees of PhoneDog 
used Twitter accounts with the business’s name in the 
Twitter account handle to promote PhoneDog’s business 
activities and provide information to its customers.37 Noah 
Kravitz was hired by PhoneDog to work as a video blogger 
and product reviewer and, in that capacity, was provided 
with a Twitter account with the handle @PhoneDog_Noah. 
 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 Id. 
34 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129229, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
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Mr. Kravitz used a password to access this Twitter account 
and tweeted on it about PhoneDog’s services and 
informational content he generated as a product reviewer 
and video blogger.38 By the time Mr. Kravitz left PhoneDog 
some four-and-a-half years later, @PhoneDog_Noah had 
approximately 17,000 Twitter followers.39 Mr. Kravitz 
refused to relinquish the account to PhoneDog when he left 
the company, continuing to use the account under a new 
handle, @noahkravitz.40 PhoneDog sued Mr. Kravitz.  
At the outset of the litigation, the court examined a 
jurisdictional challenge: Mr. Kravitz sought dismissal of his 
former employer’s case on the grounds that the $340,000 in 
damages claimed by PhoneDog was based on a faulty 
valuation.41 Mr. Kravitz argued that the jurisdictional 
threshold of $75,000, a prerequisite to litigate in federal 
court, had not been met. The court deferred this challenge 
for summary judgment adjudication, but acknowledged that 
competing methodologies existed for the valuation of the 
Twitter account and that this was a contested issue.42  
The lawsuit against Mr. Kravitz asserted that his refusal 
to relinquish control of the Twitter account to PhoneDog 
when he left the company constituted (1) misappropriation of 
trade secrets, (2) intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage, (3) negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and (4) conversion.43 The 
district court refused to dismiss the trade secret claim at the 
pleadings phase, ruling that there were evidentiary issues 
 
38 Id. at *2–3. 
39 Id. at *3. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *8. PhoneDog reached this calculation by alleging that the 
Twitter account “generated approximately 17,000 followers, which 
according to industry standards, are each valued at $2.50. Thus, 
PhoneDog contends that its damages amount to $42,500 ($2.50 x 17,000) 
for each month that Mr. Kravitz has used the account, which at the time of 
filing amount to $340,000 for eight months.” Id. 
42 Id. at *12–13.  
43 Id. at *3. 
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over whether the Twitter account password and followers 
were protected trade secrets and whether Mr. Kravitz’s 
actions constituted misappropriation.44 The conversion claim 
survived dismissal at the pleadings phase as well. The court 
determined that, under California tort law, the Twitter 
account was property and the conversion claim was at the 
“core of this lawsuit.”45  
The district court initially dismissed PhoneDog’s claims 
related to interference with economic advantage.46 Each of 
those torts required PhoneDog to demonstrate in its 
pleadings what economic relationships were disrupted by 
Mr. Kravitz’s actions, what economic harms flowed from 
these disruptions and, on the claim of negligent interference 
with prospective economic advantage, the duty of care owed 
by Mr. Kravitz to his employer, PhoneDog.47 These claims 
were reinstated when PhoneDog amended its complaint.48 
The district court reasoned that PhoneDog’s economic 
relationship with its advertisers—current and future—was 
potentially disrupted by Mr. Kravitz’s change in the social 
media account handle.49 @PhoneDog_Noah generated traffic 
to PhoneDog’s website which increased website views; this 
had a direct link to increases in advertising revenue for 
PhoneDog.50 Changing the Twitter handle allegedly 
decreased the traffic to PhoneDog’s website and 
detrimentally impacted PhoneDog’s advertising revenue. 
PhoneDog also alleged damage to its relationships with the 
17,000 Twitter followers and CNBC and Fox News outlets. 
Mr. Kravitz countered that PhoneDog did not demonstrate 
how the Twitter followers and news outlets were in economic 
relationships with PhoneDog, an argument the district court 
 
44 Id. at *15–20. 
45 Id. at *26–27.  
46 Id. at *23–26. 
47 Id. at *20–27.  
48 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10561, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012). 
49 Id. at *3–4.  
50 Id.  
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reserved for disposition at a later phase in the litigation.51 
This case eventually settled with Mr. Kravitz retaining sole 
control of the Twitter account.52 
2. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group 
In a second case, Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design 
Group,53 a lawsuit was brought by an employee against the 
business that hired her for the business’s usurpation of 
control of her social media accounts—the reverse of the case 
PhoneDog v. Kravitz. Jill Maremont was the director of 
marketing, public relations, and e-commerce at a firm 
specializing in interior design. She sued the design firm and 
its owner for unauthorized use of her social media accounts, 
in federal district court.54 The dispute arose after Jill 
Maremont was hired by Susan Fredman Design Group 
(“SFDG”) to promote SFDG’s sales; Ms. Maremont’s social 
media efforts on SFDG’s behalf were explicitly tied to her 
bonus compensation.55 Ms. Maremont’s LinkedIn page 
confirmed that her responsibilities at SFDG included 
“developing and conducting social media campaigns for 
SFDG on Facebook and Twitter.”56  
The social media marketing campaign that Ms. 
Maremont launched on behalf of SFDG included a blog 
created for SFDG that was displayed on SFDG’s website.57 
Ms. Maremont also opened a personal Twitter account and a 
Facebook account for her personal and professional use,58 
 
51 Id. at *4–5 n. 2. 
52 Susan Park & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Digital Self-Ownership: A 
Publicity-Rights Framework for Determining Employee Social Media 
Rights, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 544 (2016). 
53 No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 
2014). 
54 Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *1–3. 
55 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 




No. 2:426] BUSINESS DISPUTES OVER SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 437 
posted to these social media accounts to promote the 
business activities of SFDG, linked the Twitter account and 
the Facebook account to SFDG’s blog and website, and stored 
account access information for these accounts in a password-
protected folder on a SFDG-owned computer and SFDG 
server.59 The Twitter account that Ms. Maremont created, 
@jmaremont, had approximately 1120 followers.60  
Whether SFDG directed Ms. Maremont to open the 
Twitter account for its business was an issue contested by 
the parties.61 However, Susan Fredman did request that Ms. 
Maremont create a Facebook Page for the group. Using her 
personal account, Ms. Maremont created a Page for SFDG.62 
To manage the SFDG Facebook Page, an administrator had 
to log on through his or her personal Facebook account.63 Ms. 
Maremont claimed that she listed both herself and Susan 
Fredman as administrators of the SFDG Page, and later 
added another SFDG employee.64 Ms. Maremont denied that 
she provided direct access to the Twitter and Facebook 
accounts to SFDG employees.65 However, an SFDG intern 
claimed that Ms. Maremont gave her access to the social 
media accounts’ passwords to assist Ms. Maremont in 
posting on these platforms.66  
While off from work recuperating from an automobile 
accident, Ms. Maremont’s Twitter account was used by 
 
59 Maremont, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *5.  
60 Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *3.  
61 Id. at *3–4.  
62 Id. at *4. A Page is distinct from an Account. Accounts are tied to 
individual people. In addition to their personal Profiles, any individual can 
create a Page representing a business. The user designates themselves or 
other individuals as Administrators to manage the Page on behalf of the 
business. Administrators can post content, interact with other Facebook 
users, and connect with customers as the business. But the business never 
has its own Account. It can only operate on Facebook through individuals’ 
Accounts to manage its Page. See Pages, FACEBOOK: BUSINESS PRODUCTS, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/products/pages [perma.cc/6T6V-LDK7]. 
63 Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *4. 
64 Id. at *4.  
65 Id. at *5. 
66 Id.  
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SFDG, allegedly without her authorization, to promote 
SFDG’s business activities.67 SFDG admitted accessing Ms. 
Maremont’s personal Facebook account to post on the SFDG 
Page but denied Ms. Maremont’s allegation that her personal 
Facebook account was used by SFDG to accept Facebook 
friend requests and to make posts on her personal Profile.68 
An SFDG employee found an electronic spreadsheet with the 
social media accounts’ passwords on Ms. Maremont’s desk 
and accessed the accounts on SFDG’s behalf using this 
information.69 Ms. Maremont claimed that she told the 
owner and the president of SFDG to refrain from posting on 
these social media accounts—a claim they denied.70 When 
her employer allegedly ignored her request, Ms. Maremont 
changed the password to her Twitter and Facebook accounts, 
preventing SFDG from accessing either.71  
Ms. Maremont left SFDG and brought a lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois against the design firm and its owner, alleging legal 
violations arising from SFDG’s access and control over the 
disputed social media accounts.72 Ms. Maremont alleged 
violations of (1) the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S. C. §2701 et seq.; (3) the 
Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/1 et 
seq.; and (4) the common law right of privacy.73  
Ms. Maremont first claimed false association or false 
endorsement under the Lanham Act, which makes it illegal 
to falsely represent “‘the origin, association or endorsement 
of goods or services through the wrongful use of another’s 
distinctive mark, name, trade dress, or other device.’”74 The 
 
67 Id. at *5–6. 
68 Id. at *6–7. 
69 Id. at *5. 
70 Id. at *8. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at *1.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. at *11 (quoting L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 
9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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district court  ruled that Ms. Maremont stated a cognizable 
claim, finding that Ms. Maremont’s following on Facebook 
and Twitter was a result of her prominence as a professional 
interior designer and that she used these social media 
accounts to promote her work at SFDG.75 The commercial 
context of her Facebook and Twitter posts and the alleged 
deceptive use by SFDG of her name and likeness when it 
posted on these platforms sufficiently alleged a “commercial 
injury” under the Lanham Act.76  
Later ruling on summary judgment adjudication of this 
claim, the district court stated that the availability of relief 
under the statute was a disputed issue for the jury to decide. 
She could proceed with this claim because the jury might 
reasonably conclude that her social media accounts 
constituted a commercial interest of hers, which she would 
have a right to protect.77 Ms. Maremont could show that she 
created the Facebook and Twitter accounts “for her own 
economic benefit, knowing that if she left her employment at 
SFDG, she could promote another employer to her Twitter 
and Facebook followers.”78 The district court acknowledged 
that these social media accounts were tied to SFDG’s 
business interests as well but it ruled that Facebook and 
Twitter followers can become a “marketable commercial 
interest”79 for the employee even while she is posting 
through these social media accounts for her employer: 
A social network account not only serves the worker’s 
interest by facilitating contact with her network, but 
also helps the worker to build her reputation and 
market herself to potential employers. Specifically, 
the social network account helps the worker to 
 
75 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967, 971 
(N.D. Ill. 2011). 
76 Id. 
77 Maremont v. Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26557, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).  The district court noted that 
standing to assert a Lanham Act violation is limited to a commercial class 
of plaintiffs seeking to protect commercial interests.   
78 Id. at *13.  
79 Id. 
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develop her “personal brand”—the combination of her 
online image, reputation, and network.80 
The district court further explained that because the 
Twitter account was in Ms. Maremont’s name—and not in 
SFDG’s name—the tweets by SFDG could constitute a 
Lanham Act violation despite the fact that the tweets 
pertained to SFDG’s business activities.81 The use of Ms. 
Maremont’s Twitter account by SFDG could trigger, 
according to the district court, a false endorsement Lanham 
violation, even though SFDG tweeted a link to a blog entry 
by SFDG’s owner.82 The blog entry explained Ms. 
Maremont’s accident and related injuries, and notified 
readers that another employee would temporarily replace 
Ms. Maremont in posting on the Twitter account.83  
The false endorsement Lanham Act claim brought by Ms. 
Maremont was ultimately dismissed, however, on the issue 
of damages: Ms. Maremont admitted in her deposition 
testimony that she did not suffer any financial injury as a 
result of SFDG and its owner’s use of her Facebook and 
Twitter accounts.84 Ms. Maremont’s recovery under this 
claim had to constitute either compensation for financial 
losses she suffered or proof of unjust enrichment by SFDG 
and its owner.85 The only injuries Ms. Maremont asserted 
under the false endorsement claim were damages related to 
the mental distress she suffered over the alleged misuse of 
her social media accounts; these damages did not meet the 
financial harm contemplated under §1117 of the Lanham 
Act.86  
 
80 Id. (quoting Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade 
Secret Approach to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
201, 221 (2013)). 
81 Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *15.  
82 Id. at *15–16. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at *16–18.  
85 Id. at *18.  
86 Id. 
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The district court granted summary judgment to SFDG 
on the Illinois Right of Publicity claim. It ruled that there 
was no evidence in the record about the nature of the 
Facebook account’s postings with respect to this claim. 
Focusing on SFDG and its owner’s use of Ms. Maremont’s 
Twitter account, the district court held that this use did not 
constitute misappropriation of Ms. Maremont’s name or 
likeness because the initial tweet by SFDG linked to Susan  
Fredman’s blog, which explained Ms. Maremont’s accident 
and her replacement during her recovery by a guest 
blogger/tweeter.87  
SFDG and its owner also prevailed on summary judgment 
on Ms. Maremont’s common law right of privacy claim. The 
district court ruled that the facts discussed in the Facebook 
posts and tweets were not “private” and “Maremont did not 
try to keep any such facts private.”88 Therefore, there was no 
intrusion upon “private” matters, as the tort requires.89 In 
discussing the privacy issue, the district court did 
distinguish between Facebook posts which are “accessible 
only to those whom the user selects, and thus they are not 
strictly public” and tweets which are “usually visible and 
accessible to the general public” although tweeters can 
restrict messages to their Twitter followers.90  
The final claim advanced by Ms. Maremont alleged that 
the actions of SFDG and its owners in accessing and using 
Ms. Maremont’s Twitter and Facebook accounts without her 
authorization violated the Stored Communications Act (SCA 
or the “Act”). The district court stated that “the SCA 
provision at issue states that whoever ‘(1) intentionally 
accesses without authorization a facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided; or (2) 
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;’ 
and by doing so ‘obtains, alters, or prevents authorized 
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in 
 
87 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 
88 Id. at *21. 
89 Id. at *20–21.  
90 Id. at *21 n.2. 
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electronic storage in such system’ violates the SCA.”91 The 
district court denied summary judgment on this claim, 
determining that there were triable issues of fact as to 
whether SFDG and its owner’s conduct in accessing and 
controlling the Facebook and Twitter accounts constituted a 
violation of the SCA as well as whether this conduct 
warranted the imposition of both statutory and punitive 
damages.92 Punitive damages are recoverable under the Act 
if the evidence demonstrates that SFDG and its owner 
willfully and intentionally accessed the Facebook and 
Twitter accounts despite Ms. Maremont’s directives.93 The 
district court also noted that evidence of Ms. Maremont’s 
emotional distress related to SFDG’s access and control of 
the social media accounts could constitute actual damages 
under the statute.94 At trial, a jury ruled in favor of SFDG 
and its owner, Susan Fredman, on the SCA claim, ending the 
lengthy litigation with a judgment in favor of the business 
and its owner who were sued by their employee.95 
3. Eagle v. Morgan  
In another case brought by an employee against her 
former employer, Eagle v. Morgan,96 a business dispute 
erupted over the access and control of a LinkedIn account. 
The employee, Dr. Linda Eagle, co-owned a banking 
education company, Edcomm, Inc.97 While she was a 
principal and an employee of Edcomm, Inc., the business 
 
91 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 2701(a) and Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 635 (C.D. Ill. 
2010)).  
92 Id. at *23–28. 
93 Id. at *28. 
94 Id. at *25–28 
95 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17749, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2015). 
96 No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 
2013). 
97 Id. at *1. 
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used LinkedIn, a social media networking site devoted to 
business-related connections, to pursue marketing and sales 
initiatives of Edcomm, Inc.98 Edcomm, Inc. did not have a 
policy mandating that its employees create LinkedIn 
accounts nor did it pay to have such accounts maintained.99 
However, it did urge its employees to create a LinkedIn 
account and the business “became involved in the account 
content” of its employees, creating policies covering the 
“online content” of the LinkedIn accounts.100 Edcomm, Inc. 
also did not have a policy regarding how an employee’s 
LinkedIn account could be transferred to Edcomm, Inc. 
should an employee leave,101 although company executives 
believed Edcomm, Inc. “owned” all of its current and former 
employees’ LinkedIn accounts:  
What about LinkedIn . . . the question is who really 
owns that account?  
*** 
We do. It was created with an email account that is 
ours, on our computers, on our time and at our 
direction.102 
Pursuant to Edcomm, Inc.’s policies and practices, Dr. 
Eagle created a LinkedIn account affiliated with an email 
address provided by Edcomm.103 Dr. Eagle provided her 
LinkedIn password to certain Edcomm employees to assist 
her in managing the account.104 
 
98 Id. at *2–3. Like Facebook Pages, LinkedIn only permits businesses 
to administer Company Pages through individual users’ Accounts. 
Businesses do not have their own Accounts. Requesting to Become an 
Admin of a Company Page, LINKEDIN: HELP, 
https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/17481 [perma.cc/ 
78R8-2JZ3].  
99 Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *3. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at *6. 
102 Id. at *5. 
103 Id. at *3.  
104 Id. at *6. According to the court, Dr. Eagle shared her LinkedIn 
account password sometime “prior to her termination”—either before or 
after the stock purchase sale of Edcomm, Inc. Id. 
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Dr. Eagle and her co-owners of Edcomm entered into a 
stock purchase agreement to sell their interests to Sawabeh 
Information Services Company.105 These former business 
owners continued to work for Edcomm as employees until 
their employment was terminated several months after the 
stock sale.106 After Dr. Eagle’s termination, employees of 
Edcomm changed the password to Dr. Eagle’s LinkedIn 
account.107 For approximately two weeks, Edcomm had 
exclusive control of the social media account.108 During this 
period, Edcomm altered Dr. Eagle’s LinkedIn account 
information to include the name, picture, education, and 
experience of its interim chief executive officer, although 
some information pertaining to Dr. Eagle remained on the 
LinkedIn profile.109 Edcomm notified the public within a 
week of Dr. Eagle’s termination that she was no longer 
affiliated with it, but neglected to post this notification on 
the LinkedIn profile.110 A Google search of Dr. Eagle’s name 
during the period when Edcomm controlled the account 
confusingly brought up the LinkedIn profile with the interim 
chief executive officer’s name and likeness.111 After this two-
week period, LinkedIn took control of the account; shortly 
thereafter, Dr. Eagle regained access to it.112  
Dr. Eagle sued Edcomm and several other defendants in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania over their access, control and alteration of her 
LinkedIn account.113 She asserted eleven claims:  
(1) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C); (2) violation of 
the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C); (3) violation of 
 
105 Id. at *2. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *6. 
108 Id. at *6–7. 
109 Id. at *8.  
110 Id. at *7–8. 
111 See id. at *8. 
112 Id. at *7. 
113 Id. at *14. 
2018.2_HIDY_FINAL 
No. 2:426] BUSINESS DISPUTES OVER SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 445 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(A); (4) unauthorized use of a name in 
violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8316; (5) invasion of privacy 
by misappropriation of identity; (6) misappropriation 
of publicity; (7) identity theft under 42 Pa. C.S. 
§ 8315; (8) conversion; (9) tortious interference with 
contract; (10) civil conspiracy; and (11) civil aiding 
and abetting.114  
Edcomm, Inc. pursued counterclaims against Dr. Eagle 
for conversion, misappropriation and unfair competition.115 
Edcomm won summary judgment on the first two claims 
brought by Dr. Eagle under the CFAA, as well as the 
Lanham Act unfair competition claim.116 The district court 
ruled that Dr. Eagle’s alleged lost business opportunities 
resulting from Edcomm’s two-week control of her LinkedIn 
account were not compensable under the CFAA; damages 
involving loss of goodwill, lost revenue, or interference with a 
customer relationship are not recoverable under the 
CFAA.117 The district court also found that Dr. Eagle did not 
offer proof that Edcomm’s alteration of the LinkedIn 
account—replacing her name and likeness with the interim 
chief executive officer’s name and likeness—created a 
likelihood of confusion as required under the Lanham Act.118  
The district court adjudicated the remaining claims and 
counterclaims at a bench trial. The district court ruled that 
Dr. Eagle proved Edcomm’s use of her LinkedIn account 
violated Pennsylvania’s statutory prohibition119 against the 
unauthorized use of a name.120 Edcomm, Inc.’s unauthorized 
use of Dr. Eagle’s name—which had commercial value—
through its access, control, and alteration of her LinkedIn 
 
114 Id. at *14. 
115 Id. at *15. 
116 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614, at 
*18, *27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
117 See id. at *14–16.  
118 Id. at *23–27. 
119 See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2018). 
120 Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *17. 
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account, was done for its commercial benefit.121 The statute 
prohibits this conduct.122 The district court also found that 
Edcomm’s control and use of the LinkedIn account 
constituted invasion of privacy through the misappropriation 
of Dr. Eagle’s identity123 and violated the tort of 
misappropriation of publicity by depriving Dr. Eagle of her 
“exclusive right to control the commercial value of her name 
and to prevent others from exploiting it without 
permission.”124 While Dr. Eagle prevailed on these two 
claims, the district court ruled that she could not recover 
compensatory or punitive damages for Edcomm, Inc.’s 
violations of the law because she did not present evidence to 
support damages awards on these claims.125 She was 
awarded “compensatory damages of $0.”126 The district court 
refused to award punitive damages since Dr. Eagle did not 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Edcomm, Inc. 
acted with “maliciousness and reckless indifference.”127 
The court awarded judgment to Edcomm and the 
individually named defendants on Dr. Eagle’s remaining 
claims at the bench trial. The district court ruled that 
information about Dr. Eagle that remained on the LinkedIn 
page after Edcomm replaced the page with identifying 
information about its interim chief executive officer did not 
constitute identity theft;128 a LinkedIn account “is not 
tangible chattel, but rather an intangible right to access a 
specific page on a computer” so the tort of conversion was not 
relevant to these facts;129 and the civil conspiracy and civil 
aiding and abetting claims failed due to lack of evidence on 
how the individual defendants conspired or assisted in the 
 
121 See id. at *18–19. 
122 Id.  
123 See id. at *20–22. 
124 Id. at *23. 
125 Id. at *41–42.  
126 Id. at *42. 
127 Id. at *44. 
128 See id. at *25–26. 
129 Id. at *28–29. 
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tortious conduct.130 The district court also dismissed Dr. 
Eagle’s claim that Edcomm’s use of her LinkedIn account 
constituted tortious interference with her LinkedIn 
contract.131 Dr. Eagle did not prove damages, as required 
under this tort.132 However, the district court did note that 
other evidence established the remaining elements of the 
tort.133 There was a contractual relationship between Dr. 
Eagle and LinkedIn which Edcomm, Inc. “acted with purpose 
or intent to harm . . . by preventing that relationship from 
continuing.”134 The district court rejected Edcomm’s 
justification for its usurpation of Dr. Eagle’s account—that 
the company had an “official policy” stating that Edcomm 
owned its employees’ LinkedIn accounts and could “mine” 
these social media accounts for data and information when 
the employees left Edcomm.135 No such policy existed and 
the district court construed the LinkedIn user agreement 
which Dr. Eagle entered  into as “clearly” indicating that Dr. 
Eagle herself owned access to the LinkedIn account.136  
Edcomm, Inc lost on its counterclaims against Dr. Eagle 
for misappropriation137 and unfair competition138 and 
withdrew its conversion claim.139 Edcomm failed to establish 
that Dr. Eagle’s account was developed through the 
expenditure of Edcomm’s resources and that Dr. Eagle’s 
LinkedIn contacts list was created and maintained by 
Edcomm’s efforts.140 Because of this, the district court ruled 
that Dr. Eagle’s efforts to regain control of the LinkedIn 
account were not evidence of misappropriation or unfair 
 
130 Id. at *31–35. 
131 Id. at *31. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at *30. 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *46. 
138 Id. at *49. 
139 Id. at *15 n.3. 
140 Id. at *46. 
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competition, impliedly ruling that the LinkedIn account was 
legally hers to control at all times.141 
4. Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television  
Stacey Mattocks was unable to achieve even Dr. Eagle’s 
Pyrrhic victory in her case against her part-time employer, 
Black Entertainment Television, L.L.C. (BET). In Mattocks 
v. Black Entertainment Television,142 the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered 
summary judgment in favor of BET in a dispute between 
BET and its part-time employee, Stacey Mattocks, involving 
a Facebook “fan” page Ms. Mattocks created for a televised 
series owned by BET.143 Ms. Mattocks’ fan page was not an 
official Facebook fan page as defined by Facebook’s Terms of 
Service, which differentiates between an “official Page” 
created and maintained by an authorized representative of a 
brand and those created to express support or interest in a 
brand.144 Two years after Ms. Mattocks created her fan page, 
BET contacted her and, shortly thereafter, hired her part-
time to work on an hourly basis for BET and manage the 
show’s fan page on BET’s behalf.145 BET provided its 
trademarks and logos for the fan page, encouraged BET 
viewers to “like” the fan page, shared exclusive content with 
Ms. Mattocks to post on the page, and directed Ms. Mattocks 
on the posting of certain information on the fan page.146 BET 
employees posted content on the page as well and Ms. 
Mattocks was tasked with notifying BET of intellectual 
property infringement related to the page users.147 During 
 
141 See id. at *46–49. 
142 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
143 Id. at 1315, 1321.  
144 See id. at 1314–15.  
145 Id. at 1315–16. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1316. 
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this period, Facebook “likes”148 on the fan page grew from 
two million to over six million.149  
BET and Ms. Mattocks eventually entered into a Letter 
Agreement in which Ms. Mattocks gave full access to the fan 
page to BET, including administrative access and the right 
to update content at BET’s “sole discretion.”150 In exchange 
for these rights, BET agreed not to change Ms. Mattocks’ 
administrative rights to the page in any way to exclude her 
from page access. The parties entered into discussions about 
Ms. Mattocks becoming a full-time employee of BET. In the 
course of those discussions, Ms. Mattocks notified BET that 
she planned to restrict BET’s access to the page until their 
employment discussions were amicably resolved.151 Ms. 
Mattocks then “demoted BET’s administrative access” to the 
page, effectively preventing BET from having direct access to 
the page to post content.152 These actions triggered a cascade 
of events: BET requested that Facebook “migrate” fans from 
the unofficial page to a BET-sponsored fan page, a request 
Facebook granted. Additionally, Facebook shut down the 
page and Twitter assented to BET’s request to disable the 
Twitter account Ms. Mattocks used to promote the television 
series for BET.153  
Ms. Mattocks brought suit against BET, asserting that its 
actions with respect to these social media accounts tortiously 
interfered with Ms. Mattocks’ contractual relationships with 
Twitter and Facebook, constituted a conversion of a business 
interest, breached a duty BET owed Ms. Mattocks to act in 
good faith and fair dealing towards her, and violated the 
 
148 Id. at 1315 (quoting Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 
2013) (“‘Liking’ of Facebook is a way for Facebook users to share 
information with each other. The ‘like’ button, which is represented by a 
thumbs-up icon, and the word ‘like’ appear next to different types of 
Facebook content. Liking something on Facebook ‘is an easy way to let 
someone know that you enjoy it.’”)). 
149 Id. at 1316. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
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Letter Agreement entered into by the parties.154 The district 
court ruled that BET did not tortiously interfere with Ms. 
Mattocks’ contractual relationships with Twitter and 
Facebook because BET had a “‘supervisory interest in how 
the relationship is conducted or a potential financial interest 
in how a contract is performed’” which justified its 
interference.155 Additionally, BET’s control over the social 
media accounts during the period when Ms. Mattocks 
managed the fan page and the Twitter account, and its 
financial interest in maintaining that control, justified its 
subsequent decision to lobby Facebook and Twitter to shut 
down the accounts (and “migrate” fans to a new Facebook fan 
page). BET’s conduct, in the district court’s assessment, was 
not motivated by “purely malicious reasons,” which, if 
shown, could negate BET’s justification for its 
interference.156  
Ms. Mattocks also lost on her contract claims because the 
district court found that Ms. Mattocks was in material 
breach of the Letter Agreement when she restricted BET’s 
access to the Facebook fan page. This legally excused BET 
from performing any obligations pursuant to that 
agreement.157 Because BET was excused from any 
contractual obligations once Ms. Mattocks breached the 
Letter Agreement, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
could be imposed on BET.158 Finally, Ms. Mattocks alleged 
that BET’s request that Facebook “migrate” the Facebook 
page “likes” to a new, BET-sponsored Facebook fan page 
deprived her of a business interest she had in those “likes” as 
well as the business opportunities gleaned from those “likes.” 
159 The district court refused to categorize the Facebook 
“likes” as a “property interest” owned by Ms. Mattocks: 
 
154 Id. at 1316–17. 
155 See id. at 1319 (quoting Palm Beach Cty. Health Care Dist. v. 
Prof’l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So.3d 1090, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)). 
156 Id. at 1319. 
157 Id. at 1320. 
158 Id. at 1320–21. 
159 Id. at 1321.  
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“[L]iking” a Facebook Page simply means that the 
user is expressing his or her enjoyment or approval of 
the content. At any time, moreover, the user is free to 
revoke the “like” by clicking an “unlike” button. So if 
anyone can be deemed to own the “likes” on a Page, it 
is the individual users responsible for them.160 
The district court further found that no tortious 
conversion occurred because BET’s conduct was neither 
unauthorized nor wrongful; Facebook’s acquiescence to 
BET’s request after its review of the facts and Facebook’s 
policies confirmed this conclusion.161 
5. Vaughn v. Radio One  
In another media business dispute in which the media 
company prevailed, Vaughn v. Radio One,162 the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
granted summary judgment in favor of Radio One, the owner 
and operator of radio stations in Indianapolis, Indiana. Radio 
One was sued by its former, part-time employee, Kelly 
Vaughn, for gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 2000e-2.163 Radio One successfully defended against 
the Title VII discrimination claim by demonstrating that Ms. 
Vaughn’s termination resulted from her failure to abide by 
Radio One’s conflict-of-interest policy and her failure to take 
the corrective actions ordered by Radio One to remedy that 
conflict, which were related to Ms. Vaughn’s use of social 
media.164 The conflict of interest arose when Ms. Vaughn 
developed a television show for another media outlet with an 
on-air Radio One personality, Amos Brown. Ms. Vaughn 
created a Facebook Page and a Twitter account using the 
name and likeness of Mr. Brown and created websites to 




162 151 F. Supp. 3d 877 (S.D. Ind. 2015). 
163 Id. at 879, 885. 
164 Id. at 886.  
165 Id. at 881–82. 
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about the show, it directed Ms. Vaughn to transfer 
“ownership of the URLS and social media pages that 
incorporated the name and likeness of Mr. Brown” to Radio 
One pursuant to Radio One’s conflict-of-interest policy.166 
Ms. Vaughn refused to transfer the rights to the social media 
accounts and the URLS to Radio One; she did, however, 
delete the Facebook Page and the website promoting the 
television show.167 Radio One terminated Ms. Vaughn’s 
employment for refusing to transfer ownership of the social 
media accounts and websites and for violating its conflict-of-
interest policy.168 Without resolving the legal issue involving 
the ownership rights to either the social media accounts or 
the URLS,169 the district court ruled that Ms. Vaughn failed 
to make a prima facie showing that she met Radio One’s 
“legitimate expectations,” which were laid out in its conflict-
of-interest policy. Even assuming she had, the district court 
also found that Ms. Vaughn failed to rebut Radio One’s 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination—
violation of its conflict-of-interest policy.170  
6. CDM Media USA v. Simms 
CDM Media USA v. Simms171 involved another social 
media dispute in which corporate policies were at issue. 
Robert Simms was a senior manager at CDM Media USA 
(CDM).172 When hired, Mr. Simms agreed to abide by CDM’s 
employee handbook which required employees to keep 
confidential certain information and to return any property 
 
166 Id. at 883.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 884.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 889–91. The court also held that she failed to identify a 
similarly-situated male employee who received more favorable treatment. 
Id.   
171 No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 
2015). 
172 Id. at *3. 
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to CDM upon leaving the business.173 A few years after he 
was hired, CDM and Mr. Simms entered into a non-compete 
agreement that had a one year competition prohibition 
clause, an assignment clause of Mr. Simms’ inventions to 
CDM, and a requirement that Mr. Simms return confidential 
information to CDM when he left the company.174 As a 
senior manager, Mr. Simms had access to some of CDM’s 
“most sensitive information”175 and he was CDM’s 
designated “point person” for the online communities CDM 
used for its business.176 One of these online communities 
headed by Mr. Simms was the CIO Speaker Bureau, a 
private, member-only LinkedIn group launched by CDM and 
comprised of senior executives in the information and 
technology field.177 This LinkedIn group’s membership was 
controlled by CDM and its membership list and 
communications were not publicly available.178 The 
membership in the CIO Speaker Bureau had grown to 679 
members by the time Mr. Simms resigned his position at 
CDM.179  
When Mr. Simms resigned, CDM directed him to change 
“the contacts” for CDM’s social media accounts; Mr. Simms 
followed this directive for all the accounts except the CIO 
Speaker Bureau LinkedIn group.180 CDM accused Mr. 
Simms of refusing to return the membership information 
and communications related to that LinkedIn group and 
subsequently using this information to compete against 
CDM in violation of their non-compete agreement.181 CDM 
claimed that Mr. Simms refused to return other highly 
sensitive and confidential company information as well.182  
 
173 Id. at *2–3. 
174 Id. at *3.  
175 Id. 
176 Id. at *4.  
177 Id. at *3–4. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at *4. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at *4–5.  
182 Id. at *5. 
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CDM sued its former employee, Mr. Simms, for breach of 
contract, common law misappropriation of trade secrets, and 
violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act arising from his 
refusal to relinquish control over the CIO Speaker Bureau 
LinkedIn group. CDM also alleged in its lawsuit that Mr. 
Simms unlawfully retained CDM’s confidential information 
after he resigned from CDM and used that information to 
compete against CDM.183  
CDM successfully defended against the dismissal of the 
breach of contract claim at the pleadings phase of the 
litigation. That claim was premised, in part, on the 
confidentiality provision of the non-compete agreement 
which required Mr. Simms to “return plaintiff’s [CDM’s] 
confidential information upon leaving the company.”184 The 
district court ruled that Mr. Simms’ refusal to relinquish 
control of the LinkedIn group and his alleged use of any 
confidential information contained on that social media 
account was arguably a breach of the non-compete’s 
requirement that he return confidential information to the 
company when he left.185 The employee handbook’s 
language, however, did not create contractual obligations in 
light of the explicit contractual terms in the non-compete 
agreement that no other agreement, including any 
statements in the employee handbook, governed the 
employment relationship between CDM and Mr. Simms.186  
The district court determined that the membership list of 
the LinkedIn group could plausibly constitute a protectable 
trade secret under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 IlCS 
§1065/1 et seq. and refused to dismiss this claim at the 
pleadings stage as well.187 The district court dismissed 
CDM’s claim, however, that the “private communications” on 
the LinkedIn group contained confidential information which 
constituted a protectable trade secret: “While a private 
 
183 Id. at *1.  
184 Id. at *3. 
185 Id. at *9–10.  
186 Id. at *6–7. 
187 Id. at *12–13. 
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communication may contain a trade secret, it is not itself a 
trade secret.”188 Finally, the common law misappropriation 
of information claim survived dismissal as well.189 
7. Ardis Health v. Nankivell 
A social media account business dispute also involving a 
corporate policy stipulating the return of confidential 
information was at the heart of another case, Ardis Health v. 
Nankivell.190 In this case, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York entered a preliminary 
injunction against a former employee of Curb Your Cravings, 
L.L.C. (CYC) and USA Herbals L.L.C. (Herbals), whose 
duties included maintaining social media pages, blogs, and 
websites for a group of “closely affiliated online marketing 
companies” which had a common owner.191 The employee, 
Ashleigh Nankivell, signed a “Work Product Agreement” at 
the start of her employment with CYC requiring Ms. 
Nankivell to return all confidential information at the 
employer’s request.192 The agreement also stipulated that 
the work Ms. Nankivell developed or created while employed 
was the “sole and exclusive property” of the employer and 
constituted “work-for-hire” within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act of 1976,193 and that an actual or threatened 
breach of the agreement constituted “irreparable injury and 
damage” to the employer.194  
After Ms. Nankivell’s termination, she refused to provide 
the companies with the access information to the online 
social media accounts, emails, and websites.195 The 
 
188 Id. at *13–14.  
189 Id. at *17. The court rejected Mr. Simms’ argument that the 
Illinois Trade Secrets Act preempts a common law misappropriation of 
information claim. Id. at *16–17. 
190 No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 19, 2011). 
191 Id. at *2.  
192 Id. at *3.  
193 Id. at *3.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. at *4–5. 
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companies filed suit, alleging that her refusal prevented the 
companies from accessing these accounts and websites to 
update them.196 The district court ruled that the companies 
owned the rights to the access information unlocking these 
social media accounts, email accounts, and websites, and 
that Ms. Nankivell’s “unauthorized retention” of that 
information likely constituted conversion under New York 
law.197 Of note, the district court concluded that the 
companies provided sufficient evidence to warrant injunctive 
relief, and ordered Ms. Nankivell to provide them 
immediately with the access information198: 
Plaintiff has provided this Court with sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of irreparable harm if 
the Access Information is not returned prior to a final 
disposition in this case. Plaintiffs depend heavily on 
their online presence to advertise their businesses, 
which requires the ability to continuously update 
their profiles and pages and react to online trends. 
The inability to do so unquestionably has a negative 
effect on plaintiffs’ reputation and ability to remain 
competitive, and the magnitude of that effect is 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in monetary 
terms. Such injury constitutes irreparable harm.199 
Implicit in this ruling was the district court’s 
determination that the social media accounts managed by 
Ms. Nankivell were the property of CYC as well as, possibly, 
its related companies: “It is uncontested that plaintiffs own 
the rights to the Access Information.”200  
 
196 Id. at *1, *5. The companies also alleged that Ms. Nankivell had 
illegally retained a company laptop and committed intellectual property 
infringement. Id. 
197 Id. at *8. 
198 Id. at *9. 
199 Id. at *6–7. 
200 Id. at *8. 
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8. Christou v. Beatport 
In three lawsuits involving the music industry, courts 
examined the ownership rights of social media accounts used 
to market and promote music venues and bands. In Christou 
v. Beatport,201 a falling out between Bradley Roulier and his 
former employer—nightclub owner Regas Christou—led to 
litigation over multiple issues including access and control 
over a social media account on the site, MySpace.202 Mr. 
Roulier, a co-owner of an online music service, left his 
employment with Mr. Christou and founded a rival 
nightclub.203 Mr. Christou and his businesses accused Mr. 
Roulier and his businesses of violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, federal antitrust 
laws, trade secret theft and intentional interference with 
business expectancies.204  
Part of the alleged strategy to destroy Mr. Christou’s 
nightclub businesses involved the misappropriation by Mr. 
Roulier and his businesses of a list of MySpace profile 
“friends” maintained by Mr. Christou’s nightclubs.205 Some 
10,000 MySpace profile “friends” of Mr. Christou’s nightclubs 
were developed by Mr. Roulier and other employees for use 
by Mr. Christou’s businesses.206 When he left his 
employment with Mr. Christou’s businesses, Mr. Roulier 
and/or his representatives took the MySpace friends list as 
well as the web profile login and password and posted the 
MySpace friends list on his new nightclub’s website.207 Mr. 
Christou eventually succeeded in pressuring Mr. Roulier’s 
business into returning the list, or at least removing it from 
their website.208 At the pleadings phase of the litigation, the 
 
201 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Colo. 2012). 
202 See id. at 1074. 
203 Id. at 1062–63. 
204 Id. at 1063–64.  
205 See Christou v. Beatport, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43459, at *19 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).  
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United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
ruled that whether the MySpace friends list is a protectable 
trade secret under Colorado trade secret law is a question of 
fact and that Mr. Roulier’s actions, if proven, could constitute 
misappropriation.209 The district court also ruled that Mr. 
Roulier’s misappropriation could be imputed to his online 
music company which he co-owned.210  
In its analysis of the trade secret status of the MySpace 
friends list, the district court stated: 
Social networking sites enable companies, such as 
the SOCO clubs, to acquire hundreds and even 
thousands of ‘friends.’ These ‘friends’ are more than 
simple lists of names of potential customers. 
‘Friending’ a business or individual grants that 
business or individual access to some of one’s 
personal information, information about his or her 
interests and preferences, and perhaps most 
importantly for a business, contact information and a 
built-in means of contact.211 
The district court both recognized the strategic value of 
these social media contacts to a business and determined 
that such information is not known by employees from 
“general experience” and is not easily replicated.212 Mr. 
Christou and his businesses took reasonable steps to secure 
and safeguard the secrecy of the MySpace profile friends list 
by limiting and restricting access to passwords and profile 
login information to select employees.213 While MySpace 
users can “friend” multiple businesses, the district court 
concluded that the MySpace profile friends list was not 
information obtainable through a public directory or a source 
outside of Mr. Christou’s businesses.214 “The names 
themselves, readily available to the public, are not the 
 
209 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1074–76.  
210 Id. at 1077. 
211 Id. at 1075. 
212 See id. at 1075–76.  
213 Id. at 1075.  
214 Id. at 1076.  
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important factor,” the district court concluded.215 The trade 
secret status turned on “ancillary information” such as 
MySpace friends’ “email and contact information as well as 
the ability to notify them and promote directly to them via 
their MySpace accounts.”216 Mr. Christou and his businesses 
expended cost and effort in developing the friends list and 
the list was not easily duplicated by a competitor.217 The 
trade secrets claim and others were withdrawn at trial;218 a 
jury returned a verdict for the defense on the remaining 
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims.219  
9. Emerald City v. Kahn 
In Emerald City v. Kahn,220 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over 
litigation arising from a business dispute between a band 
musician, Jordan Kahn, and his employer, Dean Taglioli’s 
Emerald City Management, L.L.C. and Emerald City Band, 
Inc. (collectively referred to as Emerald City). When Mr. 
Kahn left his employment as a musician in Emerald City’s 
bands, he allegedly “blocked” access to Emerald City’s social 
media accounts and websites.221 The parties accused each 
other of intellectual property misappropriation, including 
claims of trade secret theft, trademark and copyright 
infringement, and violations of contract and tort law.222  
With respect to Emerald City’s claim that Mr. Kahn 
misappropriated trade secrets in violation of the Texas 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act when Mr. Kahn took possession 
 
215 Id.  
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 Christou v. Beatport, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43459, at *17 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).  
219 Id. at *7. 
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of music tracks, a customer list and passwords,223 the 
district court ruled that “as a matter of law, passwords do 
not qualify as trade secrets.”224 Looking to the definition of a 
trade secret under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the 
district court concluded that passwords lack “independent 
economic value” as required by that statute and granted 
dismissal of the trade secret claim on summary judgment 
adjudication.225  
The district court refused to dismiss Emerald City’s claim 
that Mr. Kahn’s alleged use of Emerald City’s social media 
accounts constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under Texas 
state law.226 The initial registration of the social media 
accounts in Mr. Kahn’s name, as opposed to his employer’s 
name, also implicated a breach of fiduciary duty.227 The 
district court concluded “[t]herefore, Emerald City has 
presented evidence raising a fact issue regarding whether 
Kahn’s registration of the various media accounts and 
website in his own name, and his use of Emerald City’s 
passwords after his termination constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty.”228 
The district court also noted that business losses likely 
resulted from Mr. Kahn’s social media account lock-out and 
his efforts to direct web traffic away from Emerald City’s 
website to his own website.229 Finally, the district court 
refused to dismiss Emerald City’s claim of tortious 
 
223 It is unclear from the district court’s opinion whether it is 
referring to passwords related to the social media accounts or other 
confidential, password protected aspects of Emerald City’s business 
operations such as the email system. See id. at *54–56. 
224 Id. at *55.  
225 Id. The district court distinguished passwords from customer lists 
and client information.  The former is a barrier or lock to keep secret the 
latter which may have independent economic value and constitute a 
protectable trade secret. Id. 
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interference with prospective business relationships. 
Emerald City provided evidence that Mr. Kahn’s interference 
with Emerald City’s social media accounts and website 
interrupted business dealings with prospective customers.230  
10. WBS v. Croucier 
In WBS, Inc. v. Croucier,231 a third case involving 
disputing band members and control over social media 
accounts, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California dismissed claims brought against a 
band manager for his refusal to relinquish control over the 
accounts. Rob Hoffman, the band manager of RATT, a heavy 
metal band whose trademarks were owned by WBS, was 
sued by WBS for violating California tort law. WBS alleged 
that Mr. Hoffman’s refusal constituted conversion and 
intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage.232  
Hoffman managed RATT pursuant to the directives of 
WBS, and he was the sole administrator of their Facebook 
and Twitter accounts.233 The two shareholders of WBS gave 
conflicting directions to Mr. Hoffman regarding 
relinquishing control of the social media accounts to one of 
the shareholders—Mr. Hoffman informed the shareholders of 
his “desire to remain neutral” until the shareholder dispute 
was resolved.234 The district court granted Mr. Hoffman’s 
motion for summary judgment on the conversion claim 
because WBS, Inc.’s Code of Conduct and Operation required 
a majority vote to end Mr. Hoffman’s management and 
control of the social media accounts or to threaten litigation 
against him.235 Without this vote, Mr. Hoffman’s refusal to 
turn over control of the band’s social media accounts could 
 
230 See id. at *62–67. 
231 No. CV 15-07251 DDP (JCx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155740 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
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234 Id. at *6. 
235 Id. at *18–19.  
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not be construed “to be a wrongful taking of WBS 
property.”236  
The claim of intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage was dismissed as well. The district court 
concluded that WBS failed to provide any evidence that Mr. 
Hoffman committed an independently wrongful act in 
refusing to relinquish control of the band’s social media 
accounts, as required by California tort law.237 Further, 
WBS provided no evidence that Mr. Hoffman’s actions 
caused economic harm to WBS: “WBS simply assumes, 
without any evidentiary support or citation to the record, 
that had Hoffman turned over the passwords to Blotzer’s 
counsel, WBS would have more actively communicated with 
followers over social media and succes sfully translated those 
outreach efforts into some economic gain.”238 Lacking 
evidentiary support, the intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage claim was dismissed. 
B. The Independent Contractor and Business Social 
Media Accounts 
  In Salonclick v. SuperEgo Management, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
heard a case involving a dispute between Salonclick L.L.C. 
(Salonclick), a business which manufactures and sells hair 
and skin care products, and SuperEgo Management L.L.C. 
(SuperEgo), which Salonclick hired as an independent 
contractor of marketing, public relations, and graphic design 
services, as well as administrative support.239 Salonclick 
terminated its association with SuperEgo several years later; 
SuperEgo’s principal, Mindy Yang, then allegedly accessed 
Salonclick’s website and social media accounts—a Twitter 
 
236 Id. at *19.  
237 See id. at *21. 
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239 No. 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69960, at *3 
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account and a Facebook Page—to divert followers of the 
website and social media accounts to her own business.240  
During the pleadings phase of the litigation, the district 
court examined whether Salonclick’s claims of conversion, 
replevin, trespass, and breach of fiduciary duty against 
SuperEgo should proceed. It ruled that Salonclick’s Twitter 
and Facebook accounts were intangible property protected 
under New York law’s common law torts of conversion and 
replevin.241 The district court refused SuperEgo’s later 
request to dismiss Salonclick’s conversion claim for the 
misappropriation of the social media accounts, noting the 
availability of punitive damages if the evidence 
demonstrated that the social media accounts were taken by 
SuperEgo as a result of malice or reckless or willful 
disregard of Salonclick’s rights to the social media 
accounts.242 The district court further ruled that no “demand 
and refusal” for the return of the control over the social 
media accounts was required because SuperEgo knew it had 
“no right” to control the social media accounts.243 This was 
demonstrated, according to the district court, when 
SuperEgo used Salonclick’s social media accounts to 
promote, without any authorization, its own business 
interests.244  
The district court dismissed Salonclick’s trespass claim, 
however, because Salonclick did not allege “injury to the 
chattel” as required by New York trespass law.245 In its 
ruling, the district court concluded that the social media 
accounts were “chattel” under New York law of trespass. No 
trespass of the accounts was alleged because the business 
losses arising from SuperEgo’s control of Salonclick’s social 
media accounts did not demonstrate injury or harm to the 
 
240 See id. at *3–4.  
241 Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 16 Civ. 2555 
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social media accounts themselves.246 The district court also 
concluded that even as an independent contractor, SuperEgo 
was plausibly alleged to be an agent of Salonclick with 
respect to managing and posting on the social media 
accounts, and may have owed fiduciary duties to Salonclick 
when acting in that capacity.247 At the pleadings phase, the 
district court refused to dismiss Salonclick’s breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against SuperEgo.248 
C. Business Management Companies and Social Media 
Accounts 
Business organizations who use social media accounts can 
create and manage those accounts internally through 
employees, or externally by hiring management companies 
or independent contractors to perform this work. In Keypath 
Education, Inc. v. Brightstar Education Group,249 Select 
Education, Inc. (Select) purchased certain assets of 
Brightstar Education Group, Inc. (Brightstar). Pursuant to 
this asset-purchase, Select began operating four technology 
institutes in California and Oregon previously operated by 
Brightstar.250 Prior to this asset-sale, Brightstar hired 
Keypath Education, Inc. (Keypath) to provide marketing, 
sales, and social media account management services for 
these four technology institutes.251 After the asset-sale, 
Select became concerned about Keypath’s performance of 
these services, including its alleged “failing to post content 
frequently and regularly” on the social media accounts, 
“creating social media content that was plagiarized from 
other websites,” and failing to update information on the 
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247 Id. at *13. 
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social media accounts.252 When Select terminated its 
relationship with Keypath, Select requested Keypath’s 
assistance in transitioning control of the social media 
accounts over to new entities. Keypath allegedly refused that 
assistance: 
Select Education alleges that Keypath could not 
transfer ownership or provide access to IOT 
Campuses’ social media accounts because Keypath 
created those accounts in its own name and lost the 
passwords to those accounts. Even after various 
social media vendors (such as Facebook and 
LinkedIn) proposed solutions to provide access to 
these accounts, Keypath delayed assistance and 
failed to execute the instructions of those vendors.253 
Select claimed that Keypath’s delay and interference with 
the transition of control of the social media accounts and 
other services to new entities resulted in the loss of potential 
students, the unnecessary expenditure of time and resources, 
and the delay of the launch of a new marketing campaign.254  
Keypath filed a lawsuit against Select and Brightstar in 
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
for breaches of various contracts. Select filed multiple 
counterclaims against Keypath: breach of contract, breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.255 The district court 
refused Keypath’s request to dismiss the fiduciary duty 
claim. The district court ruled that Keypath and Select had 
an implied fiduciary relationship arising from the following 
allegations: Keypath became an agent of Select with respect 
to the social media accounts; Keypath was the “owner” of 
these social media accounts and had exclusive access to the 
accounts; and Keypath created the accounts for the 
technology institutes in its own name and barred Select from 
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accessing the accounts without Keypath’s authorization.256 
Select’s relinquishment of control over the social media 
accounts was a “key characteristic” of a fiduciary 
relationship.257 
D. Bankruptcy Proceedings and Business Social Media 
Accounts 
Before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas was a case of first impression 
involving the question of “whether social media can ever be 
property of a bankruptcy estate.”258 The Bankruptcy Court 
in In re CTLI, L.L.C.259 concluded that business social media 
accounts are the property of the corporation’s bankruptcy 
estate.260 This case involved a Chapter 11 reorganization of a 
business called CTLI, L.L.C. (CTLI), a gun store and 
shooting range that, prior to the bankruptcy, was doing 
business under the name, “Tactical Firearms.”261 The 
Bankruptcy Court reasoned that the meaning of “property of 
the estate” under the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 541 includes both tangible and intangible property; 
further, the underlying state law of the bankruptcy action 
controls the determination of what specifically constitutes 
property.262 Because no Texas court had examined the issue 
of whether social media accounts can be construed as 
property under Texas law, the Bankruptcy Court guided its 
analysis by looking at other jurisdictions and concluded: 
[B]usiness social media accounts are property 
interests. Like subscriber lists, business social media 
accounts provide valuable access to customers and 
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potential customers. The fact that those customers 
and potential customers can opt out from future 
contact does not deprive the present access of value. 
Just as Facebook Users can “unlike” a Page at any 
time, subscribers to email lists can also, by federal 
law, opt out at any time.263 
This judicial determination to include a social media 
account in a bankruptcy estate turns on the Bankruptcy 
Court’s recognition that a distinction exists between 
individual social media accounts and business social media 
accounts. The Bankruptcy Court stated that individual social 
media accounts would likely not qualify as a property 
interest under the United States Bankruptcy Code because 
of the Code’s prohibition against using property to coerce an 
individual to perform personal services: “Because the value 
in a Facebook Page or Profile lies in the ability to reach 
Friends or Fans through future communications, the 
property interest in an individual Profile would likely not 
become property of the estate.”264 Noting the “liberty” 
interests and concerns connected to individual social media 
accounts, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that no such 
interests are at risk if a social media account is a business 
account, “even if the business is closely associated with an 
individual.”265  
The Bankruptcy Court then analyzed whether a Facebook 
Page titled “Tactical Firearms” was a business social media 
account. It concluded that CTLI owned the Page, not the 
former majority owner of the business, Jeremy Alcede, 
because the Facebook Page was named after the gun store 
and shooting range, Tactical Firearms; it was linked to a 
business website; the posts made by Mr. Alcede on the 
Facebook Page were related to CTLI’s business activities and 
promotional campaigns; and Mr. Alcede granted access to 
the Facebook Page to a CTLI employee through a paid 
marketing tool and granted a vendor access to the Facebook 
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Page as well to promote certain products.266 The Bankruptcy 
Court rejected Mr. Alcede’s argument that because he posted 
personal status updates on his Facebook Profile or tweeted 
political messages, the Tactical Firearms Page and Twitter 
account belong to him, not CTLI: 
The very nature of social media dictates that its best 
use for business is somewhat more subtle than other 
forms of marketing. A Tweet advertising the fact that 
the owner of a gun store is at a gun show, far from 
being especially “personal” in nature, is a perfect 
example of this kind of subtle marketing. This Tweet 
most assuredly served to develop Mr. Alcede’s 
reputation as being a well informed, connected 
insider in the gun-buying community, a reputation 
that would attract consumers to the business of 
Tactical Firearms that he was running at the time he 
issued this Tweet.267 
The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that the political 
posts on the social media accounts related to a pro-gun 
political agenda directly related to CTLI’s business.268 
Finally, the fact that the Tactical Firearms Facebook Page 
initially could only be accessed through Mr. Alcede’s personal 
Facebook Profile did not convince the Bankruptcy Court to 
classify that Page as personal and not business-related. The 
Bankruptcy Court explained that Facebook page access can 
be granted to others who also have Facebook profiles in order 
to manage a page, while not providing access to the personal 
Facebook profile itself.269 The Twitter account at issue in the 
bankruptcy proceedings was determined to be a business 
social media account as well. The Twitter account was 
originally named after the business, Tactical Firearms, with 
a Twitter handle of @tacticalfirearm.270 The summary of the 
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Twitter account described the business and the Tactical 
Firearms web page linked directly to this Twitter account.271 
In analyzing the property interests associated with the 
social media accounts, the Bankruptcy Court discussed the 
difference between the business goodwill accrued in a 
business social media account (and attributable to the 
bankruptcy estate) and the professional goodwill of an 
individual who is closely associated with a business social 
media account: 
A business social media account is in a sense a 
manifestation of the business’s accrued goodwill. The 
goodwill of a company is developed by its employees 
over the years. Nonetheless, whatever goodwill the 
individual caused to be associated with the business 
remains property of the business.272 
Mr. Alcede may have developed professional goodwill 
through his use of the business social media accounts, which 
“manifested” through the Facebook fans and Twitter 
followers of CTLI’s social media accounts.273 This 
professional goodwill attributable to CTLI’s social media 
accounts and any “property interest” associated with that 
professional goodwill can literally “follow” Mr. Alcede 
through the voluntary migration of Twitter followers and 
Facebook followers to his own personal social media 
accounts.274 Ceding control of the social media accounts to 
CTLI does not impede Mr. Alcede’s protection of those 
property interests.275  
Mr. Alcede was unsuccessful in convincing the 
Bankruptcy Court that its transfer of the right to administer 
the Facebook and Twitter social media accounts from him to 
CTLI violated his right of privacy. The Bankruptcy Court 
ruled that Mr. Alcede waived any privacy right he may have 
had in Facebook messages he sent from the Tactical 
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Firearms Facebook Page because that Page was business-
related, separate and distinct from his personal Facebook 
Profile.276 It was irrelevant that CTLI lacked a policy 
explaining to employees that the social media accounts were 
the property of CTLI; however, such a policy would put 
employees on notice that no privacy rights accrued in these 
accounts: 
Here, though to this Court’s knowledge the Debtor 
had no explicit policy regarding social media, the 
social media accounts were unambiguously property 
of the Debtor and not of Mr. Alcede personally. The 
Court concludes that given that the social media 
accounts were named for the Debtor and were used 
for business purposes, Mr. Alcede should have been 
aware that the accounts were property of the Debtor 
and thus that he did not have a personal privacy 
interest therein.277 
The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that Mr. Alcede’s 
waiver of his alleged privacy rights was confirmed by the fact 
that he provided administrative access to the Facebook Page 
to a CTLI employee and to an outside business vendor.278  
The remedial relief that the Bankruptcy Court 
contemplated—to return control of the valuable business 
social media accounts to CTLI—was complicated by Mr. 
Alcede’s actions. Facebook had granted Mr. Alcede’s request, 
per its corporate policy, to permit a one-time, irreversible 
change from the name of the Tactical Firearms Facebook 
page to Jeremy Alcede Entreprenuer.279 The Bankruptcy 
Court noted that Facebook’s “one-time-change” policy is 
triggered when a Facebook page has 200 or more Facebook 
“likes” which, according to the Bankruptcy Court, “suggests 
that Facebook is aware of the property interest inherent in a 
popular Page and the importance of helping the rightful 
 
276 Id. at 377.  
277 Id. at 378. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 374.  
2018.2_HIDY_FINAL 
No. 2:426] BUSINESS DISPUTES OVER SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 471 
owner protect this interest.”280 The Tactical Firearms Page 
had more than 11,000 likes and, pursuant to this Facebook 
policy, the page’s name could be and was irreversibly 
changed by Mr. Alcede. The Bankruptcy Court ordered Mr. 
Alcede to turn over access to the former Tactical Firearms 
Facebook page to CTLI. If CTLI were to request that 
Facebook change this Facebook page to the current business 
name and that request was not granted, the Bankruptcy 
Court stated that CTLI could seek compensatory damages 
arising from Mr. Alcede’s actions.281  Mr. Alcede also 
changed the Tactical Firearms Twitter account handle. The 
Bankruptcy Court ordered Mr. Alcede to provide a new 
password and new email address for the Twitter account to 
CTLI so that it could gain access to the social media account 
and change the Twitter handle to reflect the fact that it 
belongs to CTLI.282  
The Bankruptcy Court summarized its lengthy analysis of 
the legal issues by noting that “the social media accounts of 
Tactical Firearms were, pre-confirmation, property of the 
estate, and there is no reason not to treat them as the Court 
would treat any other assets belonging to the estate. . . . 
[T]his Court holds that the reorganized Debtor should have 
full control over these social media accounts.”283 
III. THE JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: A COMPLICATED 
LEGAL TERRAIN 
Courts have used a variety of analytical frameworks to 
examine the legal arguments in business disputes involving 
the right to control and derive economic benefits from social 
media accounts.284 The precedent emerging from these court 
 
280 Id.  
281 Id. at 374–77. The Bankruptcy Court noted an additional avenue 
of relief:  Facebook’s migration of Facebook Fans to a new Facebook Page. 
282 Id. at 377. 
283 Id. at 374. 
284 Legal scholarship has proliferated in the past several years in this 
area; notably, the scholarship proposes specific analytical frameworks for 
the analysis of legal rights arising from social media account disputes 
arising in a business context. See Argento, supra note 80 (proposing a 
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cases present judicial rationales that are complicated, 
confusing, and in certain instances, contradictory. As will be 
discussed in Part IV, this creates risk for business 
organizations operating in this legal environment.  
Federal courts, the favored forum to bring these disputes, 
evaluate both federal and state law claims when analyzing 
the rights associated with business social media accounts.  
The jurisprudence involving disputes about control over 
social media accounts has addressed a variety of issues:  
property rights, the right to control property, interference 
with economic opportunities or contractual relationships 
through misappropriation of that control, intellectual 
property violations, fiduciary duties, privacy rights, and the 
valuation of social media accounts and damages calculations. 
285 
A. Property Rights and Social Media Accounts 
The emerging precedent on the issue of property rights 
and social media accounts establishes that social media 
 
trade secrets framework); Park & Abril, supra note 52 (proposing a 
multifactor quasi-publicity rights framework); Courtney J. Mitchell, Keep 
Your Friends Close: A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 1459 (2014) (advocating for a shop-right and hired-to-
invent doctrine analogous to patent law); Tiffany A. Miao, Access Denied: 
How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property 
Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013) (arguing that the 
authorization framework of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act provides a 
superior framework to intellectual property frameworks when resolving 
social media account disputes); Smita Gautam, #Bankruptcy: 
Reconsidering “Property” to Determine the Role of Social Media in the 
Bankruptcy Estate, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 127 (2014) (arguing that 
social media accounts should be excluded from bankruptcy estates because 
they present inherent liberty interests beyond the scope of traditional 
notions of property). 
285 The precedent arises in varying adjudication phases of the 
litigation: dismissal at the pleadings stage, summary judgment, bench 
trials, and post-trial motions. The courts’ conclusions on various legal 
issues discussed in Part III are in the context of the pleading and 
evidentiary standards appropriate to each phase. 
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accounts constitute intangible property. The CTLI court 
explicitly ruled that social media accounts constitute 
intangible property and are legally protectable assets 
identical to other assets held by a business organization.286 
The PhoneDog court stated unequivocally that a Twitter 
account constitutes property.287 The Salonclick court held 
that under New York law, Twitter and Facebook accounts 
are intangible property and that the wrongful taking of this 
intangible property could constitute tortious misconduct 
under conversion and replevin claims.288 The PhoneDog 
court agreed, stating that the conversion of property claim 
was “at the core of this lawsuit.”289 The Ardis court discussed 
these property rights in the context of the access information 
itself, i.e. passwords which control the social media accounts. 
If a business organization owns the right to the access 
information unlocking social media accounts, unauthorized 
retention of that access information constitutes conversion of 
property.290  
Courts disagree on how to characterize the legal form of 
property interests in social media accounts, and also where 
to draw boundary lines for those property interests. The 
Eagle court refused to characterize wrongful control of a 
LinkedIn account as conversion under Pennsylvania law 
because it ruled that the LinkedIn account was not 
chattel.291 It concluded that a LinkedIn account is an 
intangible right of access, not tangible chattel. Therefore, no 
conversion occurred when control of the LinkedIn account 
was usurped. This contradicts the holding of the Salonclick 
court, which held that social media accounts are chattel 
 
286 In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 366–67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). 
287 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129229, at *26–27 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
288 Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., 16 Civ. 2555 
(KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).  
289 PhoneDog, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *27. 
290 Ardis Health v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120738, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011). 
291 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at 
*28–29 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
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under the law of New York.292 The Mattocks court ruled that 
even if a Facebook Page’s “likes” constituted a property 
interest, no conversion occurred when the business 
organization took over the Page because its control was 
neither unauthorized nor wrongful.293 The Mattocks court, 
however, refused to characterize Facebook “likes” as property 
interests, ruling that there were no business interests or 
business opportunities in Facebook “likes.”294 By contrast, 
the CTLI court recognized that an employee who posts on a 
business social media account may also have a “property 
interest” in those accounts associated with her professional 
goodwill developed through the social media account’s use 
and its followers.295  
B. The Right to Control a Social Media Account 
While courts largely treat social media accounts as legal 
property interests, judicial determinations differ on who has 
the right to control this property and derive economic benefit 
from it. Also, the judicial rationales used by courts to arrive 
at these determinations are crafted from different and, in 
some instances, divergent justifications. Ownership rights 
over a social media account used in business might derive 
from the motivation behind creating the account, the 
registration and name on the account, the supervision of the 
account’s content and its users’ activities, or a combination of 
all of these factors. 
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose/By any 
other word would smell as sweet.”296 Shakespeare’s insight 
was unheeded by courts that ruled the naming of a social 
media account is persuasive evidence as to who owns that 
 
292 Salonclick, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, at *11. 
293 Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1321 
(S.D. Fla. 2014). 
294 Id. 
295 In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). 
296 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (Rene Weis 
et al. eds., The Arden Shakespeare 3d ed. 2012). 
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social media account. The PhoneDog court indicated that an 
employee’s creation and naming of a Twitter handle after the 
business organization when the employee was hired, as well 
as the Twitter account’s use to promote the interests of that 
business, likely gave the business a property right in the 
Twitter account.297 The Maremont court and the CTLI court 
blurred the analysis on this ownership issue when they both 
acknowledged that both parties shared marketable and 
commercial interests in the accounts.298 However, the CTLI 
court concluded the Twitter account and Facebook Page were 
owned by the employer, not the employee. They were named 
after the business, linked to a business web page, were used 
to promote the business’s activities and interests, and access 
to these accounts was shared with individuals both within 
and outside the business.299 The Maremont court came to the 
opposite conclusion, holding that the social media accounts 
belonged to the employee despite the fact that her social 
media accounts, pursuant to her job responsibilities, were 
used to promote the business organization’s marketing 
campaigns and Maremont’s bonus compensation was tied to 
the success of her social media efforts on behalf of her 
employer.300 
The Vaughn court abstained from identifying who owned 
the disputed Facebook and Twitter pages,301 but the CDM 
court stated that a business organization had sufficiently 
alleged that control of a LinkedIn group formed at the 
direction of a business organization could constitute 
confidential information, to which the employer was entitled 
 
297 See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C-11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129229, at *2–3, *26–27 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
298 See Maremont v. Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26557, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014); In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 373–74. 
299 In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 368–70. 
300 Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *13; see also 
Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140446, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 
301 See Vaughn v. Radio One, 151 F. Supp. 3d 877, 890–91 (S.D. Ind. 
2015). 
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under a non-compete agreement.302 The Mattocks court 
concluded that the business had the right to control the 
Facebook and Twitter accounts created and managed by a 
part-time employee, which included a Facebook Fan Page 
which was not an Official Fan Page as defined by Facebook’s 
Terms of Service and which was created independently by 
someone who the business later hired as a part-time 
employee. This right to control the account arose from the 
business’s supervisory role in directing the employee’s posts 
and its financial interest in those accounts. The Mattocks 
court disregarded the fact that the employee unilaterally 
created the Facebook account prior to her employment.303 
The Ardis court relied on a work product agreement in its 
analysis and subsequent conclusion that a business 
organization and its related companies owned the access 
rights to information for accessing its social media accounts. 
Their employee signed a work product agreement which 
contained language that work created or developed during 
employment was the “sole and exclusive property” of the 
business organization, and which required the return of any 
confidential information.304 The Salonclick court implicitly 
ruled that the disputed Twitter and Facebook accounts 
belonged to a business organization, not the independent 
contractor who created and managed these accounts.305 In 
contrast, the Keypath court found a plausible fiduciary 
relationship between a management company which created 
the accounts and allegedly established itself as their owner, 
 
302 CDM Media USA v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37458, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015). 
303 See Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television L.L.C., 43 F. Supp. 3d 
1311, 1319–21 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
304 See Ardis Health, L.L.C. v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *3–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011).  
305 See Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., 16 Civ. 2555 
(KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69960, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). 
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but operated them for the benefit of the principal 
business.306  
The Eagle court diverged from this analysis and 
concluded that a LinkedIn account was a commercial 
interest owned by the employee, not her employer. The court 
acknowledged the commercial value of the LinkedIn account 
to its user, Dr. Eagle, even though the employer directed Dr. 
Eagle to create the account, the account was used to promote 
sales and marketing initiatives of the employer, the 
employer was involved in managing the account content, and 
other employees had access to and assisted in managing the 
LinkedIn account. The Eagle court also pointed to the 
language of the LinkedIn User Agreement, stating it 
conclusively established that the account’s user, Dr. Eagle, 
owned the social media account.307 
C. Social Media Accounts and Interference with 
Economic Opportunities and Contractual 
Relationships 
Courts vary in how they identify and explain the nature 
of economic relationships, economic opportunities, and 
contractual rights implicated in disputes over business social 
media accounts. The PhoneDog court ruled that tortious 
interference with economic advantage claims could proceed 
against an employee who diverted Twitter followers to a 
personal account by changing the account handle because 
the diversion potentially disrupted the business’s economic 
relationship with both current and future advertisers.308 In 
Emerald City, the court similarly held that it was a question 
of fact whether a former employee’s interference with a 
 
306 Keypath Educ., Inc. v. BrightStar Educ. Grp., Case No. 16-cv-
2545-JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *9–10 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017). 
307 See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, 
at *30, *46–49 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).  
308 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10561, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012). 
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business organization’s social media accounts interrupted 
business dealings with potential customers.309  
The CDM court concluded that a former employee’s 
control and use of the employer’s LinkedIn group could 
constitute a contractual violation of a non-compete 
agreement. The court explained that although the employee 
was the “point person”310 for the LinkedIn group, a 
confidentiality provision in that agreement required this 
employee to return confidential information, including 
confidential information contained on the LinkedIn 
account.311 The Eagle court concluded the opposite: it stated 
that a LinkedIn account was owned not by the employer but 
by the employee. Thus, the employer would have tortiously 
interfered with the employee’s contractual relationship with 
the social media provider, LinkedIn, when it exercised 
control over the LinkedIn account, if Dr. Eagle had provided 
evidence of damages.312 The Mattocks court reached a 
different conclusion, holding that an employer did not 
tortiously interfere with the employee’s contractual 
relationships with social media site providers, Twitter and 
Facebook. The court found that the employer had cognizable 
interests in the social media site user agreements between 
the employee and the providers: The business had a 
“‘supervisory interest in how the relationship is conducted or 
a potential financial interest in how a contract is 
performed,’” which justified its interference in the 
contractual agreements.313 
D. Intellectual Property Violations and Social Media 
 
309 Emerald City Mgmt. v. Kahn, No. 4:140-cv-358, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2143, at *62–67 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016). 
310 CDM Media USA v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37458, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015). 
311 Id. at *9–10. 
312 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at 
*30 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).  
313 Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television L.L.C., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 
1319 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
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Accounts 
Litigants often allege intellectual property violations in 
business disputes over social media accounts. Courts 
examine both federal and state law claims where the misuse 
of the social media account may violate intellectual property 
rights. However, the courts’ analyses of these claims conflict 
on certain issues and are idiosyncratic and fact-specific on 
others. For example, courts disagree as to what constitutes 
trade secret misappropriation in a social media business 
dispute. The PhoneDog court refused to dismiss a trade 
secret claim at the pleadings phase ruling that there were 
evidentiary issues surrounding whether a Twitter account 
password and Twitter followers were protected trade 
secrets.314 The Emerald City court disagreed on this point 
stating unequivocally that social media account passwords 
are not trade secrets because they “lack independent 
economic value.”315  
The CDM court ruled that a LinkedIn account could be 
the subject of a common law misappropriation of trade secret 
claim and that a membership list of a LinkedIn group could 
plausibly constitute a protectable trade secret under an 
Illinois state statute. However, the CDM court held that 
private communications on LinkedIn are not trade secrets in 
and of themselves, although the content of the 
communications on this social media messaging might 
contain protectable trade secrets.316 The Christou court ruled 
that a MySpace friends list could constitute a protectable 
trade secret and the misappropriation of that list by a former 
employee could be imputed to the employee’s rival company, 
which used the MySpace friend list to benefit that business. 
The strategic value of such a list, according to the Christou 
court, derives from social media networking sites’ ability to 
 
314 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129229, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
315 Emerald City Mgmt. v. Kahn, No. 4:140-cv-358, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2143, at *55 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016). 
316 See CDM Media USA v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37458, at *12–14, *16–17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015). 
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grant a business access to the contact information, an 
explanation of preferences and interests of those potential 
customers, and a “built-in” platform to contact those 
persons.317 
An employee might bring a false association or false 
endorsement claim under the Lanham Act if the employee 
creates a social media account in her own name and another 
employee from the business posts on that account. The 
Maremont court ruled that a Lanham Act violation for 
impersonation was plausible under these facts. The Lanham 
Act violation derived from the commercial context of 
Facebook and Twitter posts. The court held that the 
business’s impersonation of the employee on the Facebook 
and Twitter accounts could constitute a “commercial injury” 
under the Lanham Act.318 Even though these social media 
accounts were tied to her employer’s business interests, the 
employee arguably had a marketable commercial interest in 
her Twitter and Facebook followers because they helped to 
build her professional brand.319 Confusingly, under these 
same facts, the Maremont court found there was not a valid 
state law right of publicity claim for misappropriation of an 
employee’s name or likeness because the business tweeted 
that a guest blogger was using the account, not the employee 
in whose name the account was held.320  
The Eagle court, however, concluded that because the 
employee’s name has commercial value, a business violates 
Pennsylvania statutory law through the unauthorized use of 
an employee’s name when it accesses, controls, and alters 
the employee’s LinkedIn account. The Eagle court also ruled 
that this behavior violated the common law torts of 
 
317 Christou v. Beatport, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074–76 (D. Colo. 
2012). 
318 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967, 
971 (2011). 
319 Maremont v. Fredman., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26557, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
320 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 
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misappropriation of publicity321 and an invasion of privacy 
through misappropriation of Dr. Eagle’s identity.322 Unlike 
in Maremont, the Eagle court found insufficient evidence to 
support a Lanham Act claim.323 The Eagle court concluded 
that replacing another executive’s name and likeness on a 
former employee’s LinkedIn account did not violate the 
Lanham Act without proof of a likelihood of confusion. 
E. Fiduciary Duties and Social Media Accounts 
Courts have consistently ruled that when a business 
entrusts the management of a social media account to an 
individual or entity, the account manager owes a fiduciary 
duty to the business. These fiduciary duties arise in various 
contexts. The Emerald court stated that a former employee’s 
misuse of control over a social media account could constitute 
a breach of a fiduciary duty.324 The breach allegedly arose 
when the employee registered the social media account in his 
own name rather than the employer’s name,325 indicating 
that fiduciary duties extend even to the initial registration of 
a social media account. 
The Salonclick court ruled that an independent 
contractor could act as an agent of the business organization 
by managing and posting on the business’s social media 
accounts and owe a fiduciary duty to the business 
organization when providing those services.326 This fiduciary 
obligation arose in Keypath when a social media 
management company was hired to control and manage 
social media accounts of another business organization. 
Confusingly, the Keypath court reasoned that the social 
 
321 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at 
*23 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
322 Id. at *20–21. 
323 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614, at 
*26–27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
324 Emerald City Mgmt. v. Kahn, No. 4:140-cv-358, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2143, at *58–60 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016). 
325 Id. at *60. 
326 See Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., 16 Civ. 2555 
(KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017). 
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media account was arguably owned by the management 
company, but it had a fiduciary duty to manage that account 
on behalf of the business organization.327 
F. Privacy Rights and Social Media Accounts 
Courts examine the issue of whether privacy rights exist 
in a social media account used for business purposes. This 
legal question arises in cases where a social media account 
contains both business-related posts and personal posts, or 
where the account is identified with an individual who uses 
the account to advance the interests of a business as well as 
her own professional brand. The analytical frameworks used 
by courts to answer this question differ. One framework 
focuses on the characterization of the posts and whether they 
are private in nature. The Maremont court stated there was 
no invasion of privacy by a business when it accessed its 
employee’s Facebook and Twitter accounts because the posts 
on those accounts were not private and the employee did not 
try to keep them private.328  
A second analytical framework used by courts centers on 
the initial categorization of a social media account as either a 
business or an individual account. If the account itself is 
characterized as a business account, no privacy interests 
arise from the posts on the accounts; the account users are 
on notice that no such privacy rights exist in these accounts. 
The CTLI court ruled that no privacy rights existed in 
Facebook messages sent from a business organization’s 
Facebook page because that page was business-related. The 
CTLI court stated that a former employee and majority 
business owner waived any privacy rights by sharing 
administrative access to the social media accounts. Also, the 
CTLI court concluded that the business nature of the 
account as well as naming the social media account after the 
 
327 Keypath Educ., Inc. v. BrightStar Educ. Grp., No. 16-cv-2545-
JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *9–10 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017). 
328 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *20–21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 
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business put the employee on notice that he had no privacy 
interests in the account.329 Confusion, however, could arise 
from a distinction made by the CTLI court between 
individual social media accounts and business social media 
accounts. It noted that a social media account of a public 
figure or a celebrity could be characterized as a personal 
property interest that might not be included as property of 
the estate under bankruptcy law.330  
It is unclear how a given court might ascertain whether a 
social media account is a business or individual account. The 
legal implications of a social media account’s categorization 
as a business or individual account are significant, however. 
Further, the judicial precedent does not apply uniform 
standards on how to analyze privacy concerns: should the 
analysis focus on the nature of the social media account or 
the nature of the posts on the social media account? 
G. Social Media Account Valuations and Damages 
Calculations 
Legal scholars as well as courts acknowledge the 
difficulty in assessing the valuation of social media accounts. 
This is a substantial hurdle in the proof of damages in 
litigation disputes over control of business social media 
accounts. Limited research exists to prove the assumption 
that social media accounts have value.331 However, multiple 
courts assert that such accounts have value to business 
organizations, which expend resources to create and 
maintain these accounts and litigate over ownership rights, 
corroborating the argument that social media accounts used 
for business purposes possess value. 
The PhoneDog court recognized the problem inherent in 
the valuation of business social media accounts when it 
 
329 See In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 377–78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2015).  
330 Id. at 367. 
331 For a discussion of this issue, see Loughnane et al, supra note 14, 
at 36 (“However, there is limited research on the topic of social media 
valuation at present.”). 
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delayed ruling upon a jurisdictional challenge to a business’s 
valuation of damages over the loss of control of a Twitter 
account. The PhoneDog court acknowledged that “competing 
methodologies” exist related to the valuation of the social 
media account, deferring until summary judgment 
adjudication the complicated task of ascertaining what 
financial harm the business sustained, if any, when it lost 
17,000 Twitter followers.332 Other courts acknowledge the 
implicit value in these accounts without directly addressing 
the valuation problem. The Ardis court reasoned that a 
business would be irreparably harmed if access information 
to social media accounts was not returned until the end of 
the litigation over the control of those accounts. While noting 
the difficulty in quantifying the business harm in “monetary 
terms,” the Ardis court adamantly said that loss of the 
control over the social media accounts “unquestionably has a 
negative effect on plaintiffs’ reputation and ability to remain 
competitive. . . .”333 The Emerald City court argued that 
business losses likely resulted from a former employee’s 
social media account lock-out of his former employer to 
business-related social media accounts. Evidence of such 
losses was inferred from efforts to direct web traffic away 
from the business’s website to the former employee’s own 
website.334 
However, courts do not hesitate to discuss the economic 
attributes associated with social media accounts. The 
Maremont court cited the “commercial injury” sustained by 
an employee whose Twitter and Facebook accounts were 
usurped by her employer.335 The Eagle court similarly noted 
that an employee’s name used in her LinkedIn account had 
 
332 See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129229, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
333 Ardis Health, L.L.C. v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011). 
334 See Emerald City Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kahn, No. 4:140-cv-358, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2143, at *59 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016). 
335 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., 772 F. Supp.2d 967, 
971 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
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commercial value, which she had the exclusive right to 
control.336 A MySpace friends list provided strategic value to 
the business in Christou.337 The CTLI court explained that a 
“business’s accrued goodwill” resides in its social media 
account and remains the property of the business338 even 
while an employee’s professional goodwill may be 
simultaneously accrued in that social media account. 
Professional goodwill can “follow” the employee when she 
leaves if followers of the social media account migrate to an 
employee’s new account.339  
Despite widespread judicial agreement that social media 
accounts used in business have economic value, this problem 
of the valuation of a social media account translates into a 
problem of proving damages. Speculative or unproven 
damages derail recovery on claims brought in these business 
disputes. For example, the Eagle court awarded 
compensatory damages “in the amount of zero dollars” on 
proven violations of misappropriation of identity and 
misappropriation of publicity.340 Failure to prove damages 
torpedoed the employee’s claim that her employer tortiously 
interfered with her contract with LinkedIn.341 A claim for 
intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage was dismissed in WBS, Inc. v. Croucier because 
no evidence proved that transferring account control would 
have produced economic benefits to the shareholders of the 
business.342 The Maremont court dismissed a false 
endorsement claim brought under the Lanham Act on the 
issue of damages. Recovery under the statute required proof 
of either financial losses suffered by the complaining party or 
 
336 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at 
*23 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
337 See Regas Christou v. Beatport, L.L.C., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 
(D. Colo. 2012). 
338 In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). 
339 Id. at 373–74. 
340 Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *42. 
341 See id. at *30–31. 
342 WBS, Inc. v. Croucier, No. CV 15-07251 DDP (JCx), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 155740, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
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unjust enrichment to the business that violated the Lanham 
Act, neither of which was proffered.343 
Finally, the risk of punitive damages in social media 
account business disputes exists. The Maremont court 
allowed a claim to proceed to trial under the Stored 
Communications Act which permits the recovery of punitive 
damages if the jury concludes that the business willfully and 
intentionally accessed the employee’s social media accounts 
despite the employee’s explicit directives to not do so.344 The 
Salonclick court warned that punitive damages could be 
awarded on a conversion claim if the evidence established 
that an independent contractor misappropriated a business’s 
social media accounts with malice or reckless or willful 
disregard of the business’s right to control the social media 
accounts.345 
IV. THE RESULTANT BUSINESS RISKS AND 
PROPOSALS FOR RISK MITIGATION 
Significant risks346 exist for business organizations that 
use social media accounts. The risk involves lengthy, 
protracted litigation arising from efforts to establish who has 
the right to control these social media accounts and derive 
economic benefits from these accounts. It also includes the 
potential expenditure by business organizations of 
substantial resources and monies to pursue their legal 
rights. Calculating outcomes as to how courts will rule on 
specific legal questions and whether courts will adopt 
specific methodologies for valuation of social media accounts 
 
343 See Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2014). 
344 See id. at *23–28. 
345 See Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 16 Civ. 255 
(KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69960, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). 
346 See, e.g., Nadelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically, 73 
LA. L. REV. 449, 461 (2013) (“Broadly speaking, risk is the potential for an 
outcome to deviate from what is expected.”). This Article discusses the 
critical importance of risk analysis and risk mitigation in order to 
strategically create and sustain value in business organizations. 
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is difficult given the wide array of judicial rationales adopted 
by courts on such issues. Additionally, business 
organizations may be sued over the control of social media 
accounts and may face, in certain instances, the risk of 
punitive damages if their behavior warrants imposition of 
such damages. 
The reputational risk to a business associated with the 
loss of its ability to control messaging on its social media 
accounts compounds the harm resulting from financial losses 
such as lost revenue. A hostile takeover of a social media 
account by a disgruntled employee, independent contractor, 
former business partner, or management company could 
result in significant reputational harm or damage to the 
brand which is not easily remedied or repaired. Revenue risk 
is a relevant risk as well. As detailed in Part I, social media 
accounts are engines of advertising, marketing, and 
branding increasingly relied upon by business organizations 
to communicate, connect and transact with customers, 
clients, and the public. Multiple courts have ruled that 
interfering with a social media account imperils a business’s 
ability to use the social media platform to sell its products 
and services. In its broadest terms, lost business 
opportunities result from the disruption of control over a 
business social media account. Finally, the risk of 
intellectual property misappropriation, including the theft of 
trade secrets which provide strategic and competitive 
advantages to a business, is recognized by courts as well. 
The judicial precedent establishes that business 
organizations must navigate a complex legal environment 
and face multiple risks when disputes occur over the control 
of social media accounts. The examined cases provide a 
blueprint for how business organizations can mitigate these 
risks. Below is a proposed framework for risk mitigation. 
A. The Creation of Social Media Accounts 
A business organization decreases the risk that a social 
media account will be judicially determined to be the 
property of an employee or other entity if it: (1) names the 
social media account after the business; (2) links the social 
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media account to a business page or website; (3) ensures that 
posts on the account are related to business activities and 
promotional campaigns; (4) provides a social media account 
summary that identifies the business purpose of the account; 
and (5) shares access to the account with multiple 
individuals within the business organization.347  
The business organization should document that it 
directed an employee, independent contractor, or external 
management company to create and manage the account 
solely and exclusively on behalf of the business. The business 
organization can further mitigate risk by entering into an 
agreement explicitly stating that the social media accounts 
are created solely for the economic benefit of the business 
and, in the case of an employee managing the account, are 
not created or maintained for the benefit of the employee.348 
If a social media account is created in an individual’s name, 
the business organization should solicit an acknowledgment 
or agreement from that individual that the account was 
created at the direction of the business organization in the 
context of the work the employee or individual performs for 
the business organization and posts made on that account 
are for the sole benefit of the business organization.349 
B. The Management of Social Media Accounts and 
Company Policies 
Risk mitigation strategies should continue once social 
media accounts are created. Business organizations should 
adopt policies detailing the creation, management, and 
retention of control over social media accounts. Managers 
 
347 See, e.g., In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 366–79 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2015). 
348 See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011); Maremont v. 
Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 
2014). 
349 See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, 
at *3-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013); see also Maremont, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26557, at *3–5. 
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should be trained on the policies and implement practices 
consistent with these policies, including routine audits which 
monitor and test whether the policies are adhered to and 
compliance is achieved.  
These policies should include notification to employees, 
independent contractors, and social media management 
companies that the social media accounts are the exclusive 
property of the business organization350 and that the social 
media accounts are subject to content review and revision by 
the business organization.351 The policies should also clearly 
state that an employee or manager of a social media account 
has no privacy rights in the account, regardless of whether 
the account is a privately-maintained or publicly-available 
account.352 The business should procure and document 
acknowledgment of these policies. 
Employees who create and manage business social media 
accounts should be trained on the use of the account. 
Employees should also be monitored on their management of 
these accounts and evaluated on their conduct, as part of 
their employment review. Training, monitoring, and 
evaluating an employee on social media use signals to these 
employees and to the courts that the social media account is 
the property of the business and its management is for 
business purposes exclusively. Employers should draft and 
enforce a policy specifically related to the transfer of the 
social media account to the control and management of 
another employee when the employee leaves the business.353 
This policy can include language prohibiting an employee 
from changing the name of a social media account or 
 
350 See, e.g., Ardis Health, L.L.C. v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 
(NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *2–9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011). 
351 See, e.g., Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television L.L.C., 23 F. Supp. 
3d 1311, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
352 See In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 377–78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2015). 
353 See Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *7; PhoneDog, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *2–3. 
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otherwise attempting to divert social media account 
followers from the business organization.354 
A business organization can adopt a conflict of interest 
policy, empowering the business to discipline and even 
terminate an employee who uses social media accounts in a 
way that competes with the business or misuses the 
business’s intellectual property or proprietary 
information.355 A corporate policy on the return of 
confidential information should include the return of access 
information for social media accounts.356  
C. Contract Review and Due Diligence Involving Social 
Media Accounts 
Business organizations may mitigate risk through the 
careful drafting and review of contracts which relate to the 
rights and duties surrounding social media account control. 
Requiring an employee to sign a work product agreement at 
the start of employment diminishes the risk of losing control 
over a social media account if the agreement stipulates that: 
(1) all confidential information of the employer must be 
returned by the employee at the request of the employer; (2) 
the work developed by the employee or created while 
employed at the business is the sole and exclusive property 
of the employer and constitutes “work for hire”; and (3) any 
actual or threatened breach of the work product agreement 
constitutes irreparable injury and damage to the 
employer.357 
Non-compete agreements can be broadly drafted to 
prohibit employees from “taking” social media accounts with 
 
354 See Emerald City Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kahn, No. 4:14-cv-358, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2143, at *58–60 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016); PhoneDog, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *3. 
355 Vaughn v. Radio One of Ind., 151 F. Supp. 3d 877, 880–81 (S.D. 
Ind. 2015); see also CDM Media United States, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14 CV 
9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015). 
356 See, e.g., CDM Media, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *2–5. 
357 Ardis Health, L.L.C. v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011). 
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them, using information from those accounts, and failing to 
return “property” associated with those accounts, including 
access passwords for these accounts.358  
Business organizations that outsource the creation or 
management of a social media account to independent 
contractors or management companies should draft and 
enter into social media account contracts with those entities. 
These contracts should stipulate that the business has 
exclusive ownership and control over the accounts and that 
the entity managing it owes a fiduciary duty to manage the 
account on behalf of the business.359 Business organizations 
should closely monitor and control the sharing of intellectual 
property on social media accounts as well.360 
A business organization conducting due diligence in 
connection with business acquisitions, mergers, or asset 
purchases should investigate and review contracts or 
affiliations involving the management of social media 
accounts. This review should include identifying who has 
access and control over these accounts, whether the 
contractual obligations survive the merger, acquisition, or 
asset purchase, and how transfer of the control over the 
account will occur after the closing on the transaction.361 
This due diligence should include an assessment of the 
quality of the management of the social media accounts.362 
 
358 A business organization should draft contractual language (such 
as a non-compete or confidentiality agreement) in a manner that does not 
vitiate binding language in the employee handbook. See CDM Media, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *3–10.  
359 See Keypath Educ., Inc. v. BrightStar Educ. Grp., No. 16-cv-2545-
JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *3–6 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017); 
Salonclick, L.L.C. v. SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017). 
360 Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television L.L.C., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 
1315–16 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
361 See Keypath, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *3–6. 
362 See id. 
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D. Remedies and Risk Management of Social Media 
Account Disputes 
 An analysis of the judicial precedent reveals risk 
mitigation strategies a business organization can employ—
both pre-dispute and post-dispute—to contain the 
detrimental effects on a business embroiled in a dispute over 
a social media account. These strategies include enlisting the 
aid of social media providers, avoiding conduct that could 
justify punitive damages awards, and selecting 
methodologies that substantiate valuations of social media 
accounts. 
Prior to a dispute, business organizations should review 
the social media policies and contracts of social media 
providers that govern the social media accounts used by the 
business. If a dispute erupts over the control of an account, 
the business organization can enlist the support of these 
social media providers to regain control over these accounts. 
These policies and contracts may empower the social media 
provider to take proactive action to assist the business 
organization in establishing its property rights in the 
account.363 The business organization’s policies, or lack 
thereof, in establishing its ownership rights in the account 
are relevant to the social media provider’s assessment of who 
should control the account.  
A business organization should be alert to the risk that 
an employee, independent contractor, or management 
company may pre-emptively contact the social media 
providers and convince them to irrevocably change the 
accounts, damaging the business organization’s ability to 
recover control over the social media accounts and access to 
account followers.364 Courts struggle to provide adequate 
remedies where social media providers’ policies prevent them 
from undoing certain actions.365 
 
363 See, e.g., Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1316–17. 
364 See In re CTLI, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 359, 374–76 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2015). 
365 See id. at 374–77. 
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As social media account disputes carry the risk of 
punitive damages366 so business organizations should 
proceed prudently in the wake of a social media account 
dispute. Evidence of malice or willful disregard of an 
employee’s directives to refrain from accessing a social media 
account can justify punitive damages, depending on the 
claims brought in the litigation and how a court examines 
ownership rights over the account. To mitigate this risk, the 
business organization should train employees to seek the 
guidance of legal counsel when a social media account 
dispute occurs. Counsel can evaluate the facts, identify the 
rights over the accounts, and take appropriate action to 
maintain, regain, or refrain from exercising control over the 
social media account.  
Legal redress may include seeking emergency judicial 
relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction.367 If legal redress is sought, a court 
will require proof of the social media account’s value as well 
as the damages related to the account’s misuse. The risk 
business organizations face, like other litigants in these 
cases, is an inability to convince a court of a compelling 
methodology for the valuation of the social media account 
and the specter of speculative arguments on financial losses 
related to the account’s misuse.368 To mitigate this risk, 
business organizations should adopt a methodology, pre-
dispute, to provide accurate valuations of its social media 
accounts and to substantiate these accounts’ connections to 
business revenue.369 These valuations should be tracked, 
audited, and continuously updated for use by a court seeking 
reliable evidence on damages. 
 
366 See, e.g., Maremont v. Fredman, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26557, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2014); Salonclick, L.L.C. v. 
SuperEgo Mgmt., L.L.C., 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
69960, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). 
367 See, e.g., Ardis Health, L.L.C. v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 
(NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011). 
368 See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34220, at *40–42 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
369 See Loughnane et al., supra note 14, at 36. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Business organizations’ increasing reliance on social 
media for sales, marketing, and branding presents unique 
challenges to those organizations in risk identification and 
mitigation as social media account disputes over the right to 
control and derive economic benefits from these accounts 
proliferate. The risk exposure intensifies as business 
organizations navigate a complex and complicated legal 
environment in which courts struggle to apply coherent and 
consistent legal rules to define and delineate the rights 
related to these social media accounts. Risk mitigation 
efforts focused on creating and communicating clear and 
comprehensive policies and procedures regarding the 
ownership of these accounts can assist business 
organizations in securing their rights. 
 
